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Enforcement 
Litigation is slow and the Internet is fast . . . .  I don’t think it makes 
much sense for us to ask the Government to be the police in this 
issue.  What we would like is to be deputized to solve our own 
problems.1 
– Steven Soderbergh, Directors Guild of America 
t the end of 2008, the Recording Industry Association of 
America (RIAA) concluded its five-year campaign of litigation 
against individual peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharers and announced that 
it would be shifting its online copyright enforcement efforts to a 
model known as graduated response.2  As it has been presented by the 
RIAA and other industry groups, the enforcement paradigm embodied 
in graduated response eschews litigation and statutory mandates in 
favor of voluntary cooperation between rights owners and Internet 
access providers—parties that have long been at loggerheads with 
each other in the war on piracy.  The Business Software Alliance 
(BSA), for example, has publicly advocated bypassing Congress to 
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1 Sinking the Copyright Pirates: Global Protection of Intellectual Property: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 111th Cong. 28 (2009) (statement of Steven 
Soderbergh, National Vice President, Directors Guild of America), available at 
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/111/48986.pdf. 
2 Sarah McBride & Ethan Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 19, 2008, at B1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122966038836021137 
.html. 
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pursue a “voluntary industry-led approach,” which it predicts will 
prove more effective than further governmental intervention along the 
lines of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).3  A 
representative of the RIAA expressed the same view in testimony 
before Congress concerning the proposed Internet Freedom and 
Preservation Act of 2008.4  More recently, in comments filed with the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in connection with the 
notice of proposed rule-making concerning the preservation of the 
open Internet (the Open Internet NPRM), the Motion Picture 
Association of America (MPAA) asked the government to step aside 
and “not interpose any legal or regulatory obstacles” (e.g., in the form 
of net neutrality mandates) that would prevent rights owners and 
broadband providers from working together to implement graduated 
response.5  Unlike in Europe and other places abroad, where trade 
associations representing corporate rights owners have advocated 
with some success for legislatively mandated graduated response 
regimes, the domestic campaign—so far, at least—has focused on 
interindustry negotiations involving technology-based solutions 
capable of private implementation.6 
 
3 BSA Position on Appropriate Measures to Deter Online Piracy of Content, BUSINESS 
SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, http://www.bsa.org/country/Public%20Policy/online-content          
-piracy.aspx (last visited Oct. 2, 2010). 
4 The Internet Freedom Preservation Act of 2008: Hearing on H.R. 5353 Before the H. 
Subcomm. on Telecomms. and the Internet of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 
110th Cong. (2008) (written statement of Mitch Bainwol, Chairman and CEO, RIAA), 
available at http://76.74.24.142/F382DD78-ECE4-2026-BD0C-33C4ED1A0D44.pdf 
(“Our view is that the marketplace is generally a better mechanism than regulation for 
addressing such complex issues as how to address online piracy.”); Recording Indus. 
Ass’n of Am., RIAA CEO Encourages ISPs to Work with Music Industry to Address 
Digital Theft, RIAA NEWS ROOM (May 6, 2008), http://www.riaa.com/newsitem.php 
?news_month_filter=5&news_year_filter=2008&resultpage=2&id=445DBB88-3C46-F2 
B7-784F-8B1B1B7F5FAA (announcing “constructive discussions with a number of ISPs 
about ways to address the piracy problem, including mechanisms like graduated response  
. . . and business solutions through negotiations between individual music companies and 
ISPs that can capture the value of music being consumed by subscribers”). 
5 In the Matter of A National Broadband Plan For Our Future: Comments of the 
Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., Inc. in Response to the Workshop on the Role of Content in 
the Broadband Ecosystem Before the Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, GN Docket No. 09-51, at 
21 (2009), available at http://www.mpaa.org/Resources/b55c4e2c-3510-424d-b12f            
-6719b86552ea.pdf. 
6 For a full discussion of the efforts that have been and are being made abroad, 
including the highly controversial adoption of a mandatory three-strikes regime in France, 
see Jeremy de Beer & Christopher D. Clemmer, Global Trends in Online Copyright 
Enforcement: A Non-Neutral Role for Network Intermediaries?, 49 JURIMETRICS J. 375 
(2009).  With respect to domestic strategy, Cary Sherman, the RIAA’s President, has 
stated that there is no need to “relegislate” the role of ISPs in enforcing copyrights online, 
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This turn to private ordering and technology-based solutions 
represents a departure from the dominant strategies of lobbying and 
litigation that corporate rights owners have pursued domestically 
since the early days of the digital revolution.  On the lobbying front, 
rights owners pressed for—and won—greater statutory protection of 
copyrights and stiffer penalties for infringement.7  On the litigation 
front, they sued—and beat—both the purveyors and the users of 
disruptive technologies for copying and distributing digital content, 
most notably P2P software.8  None of these efforts, however, made 
much of a dent in the prodigious volume of illegally traded files.9  
Hence, the emerging belief among rights owners is that the time is 
ripe for a strategic shift away from public law and litigation,10 toward 
partnerships with internet service providers (ISPs)11 and an 
 
and the RIAA is “much more interested in finding a marketplace way of going about this.”  
Anne Broache, RIAA: No Need to Force ISPs by Law to Monitor Piracy, CNET NEWS, 
Jan. 30, 2008, http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9861460-7.html (quoting Cary 
Sherman).  Sherman acknowledged that the approach being taken abroad, particularly in 
Europe, is “more of a regulatory approach.”  Id. 
7 These include, for example, the anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified in 
scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.), the redefinition of criminal infringement and its penalties 
in the No Electronic Theft (NET) Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997), and the 
extension of the term of copyright in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. 
L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998). 
8 See generally Annemarie Bridy, Why Pirates (Still) Won’t Behave: Regulating P2P in 
the Decade After Napster, 40 RUTGERS L.J. 565 (2009) (discussing the leading cases 
against both P2P software providers and individual file sharers). 
9 According to the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI), which 
represents music industry trade associations worldwide and which collated studies from 
sixteen countries over a four-year period, an estimated forty billion music files were 
illegally shared in 2008, which represents ninety-five percent of all downloaded music.  
IFPI, DIGITAL MUSIC REPORT 2009: NEW BUSINESS MODELS FOR A CHANGING 
ENVIRONMENT 22 (2009), available at http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/DMR2009-real 
.pdf.  There is, however, justified skepticism concerning industry-generated statistics 
relating to online piracy and piracy-related economic losses.  See, e.g., Nate Anderson, 
Rep “Hollywood” Berman Calls for New IP Law—Using Dodgy Data, ARS TECHNICA, 
Apr. 8, 2009, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/04/rep-howard-berman-calls   
-for-new-ip-law-using-dodgy-data.ars (pointing out that the IFPI also found, but did not 
emphasize, that only eighteen percent of Internet users in Europe actually share files 
illegally). 
10 Peter Yu has pointed out the ways in which “the graduated response system provides 
an attractive alternative to many of the unpopular legal tactics deployed via civil lawsuits 
and criminal prosecutions.”  Peter Yu, The Graduated Response, 62 FLA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2010). 
11 The term “ISP” is often used broadly to encompass both Internet access providers and 
other types of online service providers; however, I use it throughout this Article 
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enforcement regime that operates on Internet users through a 
combination of technology and private law mechanisms, such as 
standardized terms of service and acceptable use policies.12 
The most widely publicized form of graduated response is a “three 
strikes and you’re out” model, in which Internet access is suspended 
or terminated by a user’s ISP following the user’s receipt of three 
successive notices of copyright infringement.13  The division of labor 
between rights owners and ISPs with respect to monitoring and 
notification of infringement varies from one permutation of graduated 
response to the next.  The most aggressive and controversial regime, 
for example, is one in which ISPs implement filtering technologies 
within their networks and fully automate the processes of notification 
and termination/suspension.14  Some colleges and universities have 
already adopted this model of graduated response in an effort to 
comply with the Higher Education Opportunity Act of 2008 (HEOA), 
which expressly requires them to develop copyright enforcement 
plans that include technology-based deterrents to online 
infringement.15  Regardless of the precise division of labor, in all 
 
exclusively to denote Internet access providers, most of which are now providers of 
broadband access. 
12 Music industry representatives have emphasized publicly, however, that if voluntary 
agreements with ISPs cannot be reached, they will pursue legislation mandating 
cooperation.  See Declan McCullagh, Music, Movie Lobbyists Push to Spy on Your Net 
Traffic, CNET NEWS, Aug. 18, 2008, http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-10019622-38 
.html (“A representative of the recording industry said . . . that her companies would prefer 
to enter into voluntary ‘partnerships’ with Internet service providers, but pointedly noted 
that some governments are mandating such surveillance ‘if you don’t work something 
out.’”); Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., supra note 4 (asserting that “government action 
may be necessary” if ISPs do not embrace a marketplace solution). 
13 This model has been advocated publicly by the Business Software Alliance (BSA), a 
trade group representing software manufacturers.  See BUSINESS SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, 
supra note 3.  The BSA favors the use of “[a]utomated educational notification 
mechanisms for alleged online infringers” and “[t]he imposition of appropriate sanctions, 
including . . . the suspension or termination of Internet service for individual repeat 
offenders.”  Id.  The RIAA has been actively pursuing graduated response agreements with 
ISPs.  See McBride & Smith, supra note 2 (reporting on preliminary deals with ISPs 
pursuant to which repeat notifications of infringement are to be followed by termination of 
access). 
14 This comprehensive and fully automated form of graduated response is offered by 
Audible Magic, among others.  Audible Magic offers an appliance called CopySense, 
which is widely marketed to IT departments at colleges and universities.  Solutions for 
Colleges & Universities, AUDIBLE MAGIC, http://www.audiblemagic.com/solutions 
/universities.asp (last visited Oct. 2, 2010). 
15 The HEOA conditions participation in federal financial aid programs on certification 
that the participating institution “has developed plans to effectively combat the 
unauthorized distribution of copyrighted material, including through the use of a variety of 
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forms of graduated response the onus of enforcing digital copyrights 
is shared between content providers and ISPs, and repeated notices of 
infringement—from whichever source they emanate—culminate in at 
least a temporary suspension of Internet access.16 
This Article seeks to explain why voluntary graduated response, as 
publicly controversial as it is, is squarely on the table as corporate 
rights owners and broadband providers discuss their respective roles 
in the future of online copyright enforcement.17  It situates the 
rapprochement now taking place between the two groups within the 
context of copyright law’s special rules of liability for intermediaries 
that act as “mere conduits” for their customers’ communications.  
These rules, which have historically insulated ISPs from liability for 
the infringing transmissions of their customers, are becoming less 
clearly applicable as broadband providers deploy “intelligent” routers 
within their networks, giving them the ability to inspect, sort, and 
filter the traffic they carry.18  As broadband business models evolve 
away from the traditional model of passive carriage, ISPs risk 
sacrificing the special protections that have developed over time to 
shield neutral intermediaries from liability for copyright infringement.  
This potential exposure gives ISPs a compelling incentive to explore 
private partnerships with rights owners that would once have been 
politically unthinkable. 
 
technology-based deterrents.”  20 U.S.C.S. § 1094(a)(29)(A) (LexisNexis 2009).  Rules 
promulgated under the HEOA require that these plans be implemented effective July 1, 
2010.  See 34 C.F.R. § 668.14 (2010).  According to Audible Magic’s Web site, the 
CopySense appliance is in use at over fifty colleges and universities.  See CopySense 
Customers—Colleges & Universities, AUDIBLE MAGIC, http://www.audiblemagic.com 
/clients-partners/copysense.asp (last visited Oct. 2, 2010). 
16 The IFPI couches discussions of graduated response in terms of “extending 
responsibility for copyright protection across the value chain to include ISPs.”  IFPI, supra 
note 9, at 24. 
17 High-level representatives from both camps have come together publicly in venues 
such as the Progress and Freedom Foundation’s Aspen Summit in 2008 and the Leadership 
Music Digital Summit in 2009.  See Chloe Albanesius, Comcast, Others Deny ‘Three 
Strikes’ Piracy Plan, PCMAG.COM, Mar. 27, 2009, http://www.pcmag.com/article2 
/0,2817,2343977,00.asp (reporting on the Leadership Music Digital Summit); McCullagh, 
supra note 12 (reporting on the Aspen Summit). 
18 See Rob Frieden, Internet Packet Sniffing and Its Impact on the Network Neutrality 
Debate and the Balance of Power Between Intellectual Property Creators and Consumers, 
18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 633, 645 (2008) (“The output of 
affordable deep packet inspection and other technologies now available to ISPs raises 
questions whether non-neutral network operation disqualifies ISPs for a safe harbor 
exemption from liability for carrying copyright infringing traffic provided by § 512 of the 
DMCA.”). 
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Part I of this Article examines the treatment of so-called conduit 
ISPs under the safe harbor framework of the DMCA.  It focuses on 
the interaction between § 512(a), which governs providers of routing, 
transmission, and connection services, and two other provisions of the 
DMCA—§ 512(i), which concerns the punishment of repeat 
infringers, and § 512(h), which concerns the issuance of subpoenas to 
identify alleged infringers.  Section 512(i) and the cases interpreting it 
provide a credible rationale for ISP adoption of graduated response 
that predates both the use of the catchphrase and the attention the 
concept has lately attracted in the tech media.19  Section 512(h) and 
the cases interpreting it are relatively less helpful to rights owners vis-
à-vis conduit ISPs, but they have prompted the negotiation of private 
agreements pursuant to which major ISPs voluntarily forward notices 
of infringement to customers.  These limited agreements, which are in 
the spirit of cooperation that the DMCA was intended to foster, may 
represent the first step in a more complete private ordering of the 
project of online copyright enforcement. 
Part II of this Article explores the liability implications of 
departing, as broadband ISPs have, from the model of passive 
carriage contemplated in § 512(a).  It begins with an abridged history 
of common carriage, goes on to consider copyright liability rules 
(other than the DMCA) that ease burdens on passive carriers, and 
concludes with a discussion of the legal consequences that may flow 
from the decision of broadband providers to implement intelligent 
network technology to gain greater control over the traffic that crosses 
their networks.  Considering these consequences, it may be no more 
than prudent from a liability standpoint for broadband operators to 
engage with content owners in a renegotiation of the division of labor 
for online copyright enforcement. 
Part III concerns the potential impact of such a renegotiation on 
broadband users, who have come to rely on uninterrupted Internet 
connectivity to participate in an ever-widening range of important life 
activities that are unrelated to commerce in copyrighted digital works.  
Proceeding from the premise that the government is unlikely in the 
name of net neutrality to prohibit ISPs from blocking infringing file 
transfers, Part III proposes a number of principles to guide private 
 
19 Coverage of graduated response in the tech media tends to elide the fact that the 
DMCA, now over ten years old, contains a provision—section 512(i)—that contemplates 
the termination of service for repeat copyright infringers.  See, e.g., Greg Sandoval, AT&T 
First to Test RIAA Antipiracy Plan, CNET NEWS, Mar. 24, 2009, http://news.cnet.com 
/8301-1023_3-10203799-93.html. 
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ordering in the arena of online copyright enforcement so that 
consumers do not become victims of immature filtering technologies 
and overzealous enforcement. 
I 
“CONDUIT” ISPS, THE DMCA, AND THE WAR ON P2P 
A.  A Refuge for Passive Carriers: § 512(a) 
When it comes to liability for online copyright infringement, the 
safe harbor provisions in § 512 of the DMCA have defined the legal 
environment for ISPs for more than a decade.20  It’s worth bearing in 
mind, however, that it was once far from given that online service 
providers should be in any way relieved of liability for the 
infringements of their customers or that they should not be required to 
take costly steps to police their networks for infringing content 
transmitted or stored by their customers.21  Indeed, if Congress had 
been persuaded in 1995 by the recommendations of President 
Clinton’s Information Infrastructure Task Force (IITF), ISPs would 
have been pressed into service as active copyright enforcers long ago 
through the operation of liability rules developed in and for the analog 
age.22 
In its much anticipated 1995 report on the National Information 
Infrastructure, now known simply as the “White Paper,” the IITF 
rejected arguments that the growth of the Internet and the viability of 
online services would be threatened by liability rules under which 
providers would be responsible for the copyright infringements of 
their subscribers.23  The IITF saw a number of reasons, both 
pragmatic and philosophical, for not letting ISPs off the hook for the 
infringing activities of their subscribers.  One was that ISPs are well 
positioned to serve an enforcement function because they have the 
 
20 See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006). 
21 See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1556 (M.D. Fla. 1993) 
(holding the operator of a BBS liable for copyright infringement because he “supplied a 
product containing unauthorized copies,” even though he himself did not make the copies 
of the infringing pictures). 
22 See BRUCE A. LEHMAN, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE 
WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 114–24 (1995), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/ipnii/ipnii.pdf (making recommendations 
concerning the scope of online service provider liability for copyright infringement). 
23 Id. at 115–17. 
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ability to disconnect subscribers who break the law.24  Another was 
that immunity could give providers a perverse incentive to remain 
willfully ignorant of illegal activity occurring on their systems.25  A 
third was that ISPs “reap rewards for infringing activity” in the form 
of added subscribers and increased usage, and they should therefore 
“bear the responsibilities” associated with that activity.26  Given all of 
these factors, the IITF concluded that liability for distributing illegal 
content provided by others is rightly treated as a cost of doing 
business for all information distributors, regardless of whether they do 
business in real space or cyberspace.27  To alter existing standards of 
liability in any way, the IITF said, “would result in a substantial 
derogation of the rights of copyright owners.”28  In the proposed 
legislation submitted with the White Paper, there were thus no 
provisions that would in any way have insulated or protected online 
intermediaries from liability arising from their users’ infringing 
conduct.29 
Although the IITF thought it was “premature to reduce the liability 
of any type of service provider,”30 it did recognize that a one-size-
fits-all approach might not be the best policy, given the diverse 
functions that online providers serve: 
On-line service providers currently provide a number of services.  
With respect to the allowance of uploading of material by their 
subscribers, they are, in essence, acting as an electronic publisher.  
In other instances, they perform other functions.  No one rule may 
be appropriate.  If an entity provided only the wires and conduits—
such as the telephone company, it would have a good argument for 
an exemption if it was truly in the same position as a common 
carrier and could not control who or what was on its system.  The 
same could be true for an on-line service provider who 
unknowingly transmitted encrypted infringing material.31 
 
24 Id. at 122–23. 
25 Id. at 122. 
26 Id. at 117–18. 
27 Id. at 117 (pointing out that “this problem has been a part of the cost of doing 
business for many other distributors of material that is provided to them by others”); id. at 
118 (stating, again, that “[t]he risk of infringement liability is a legitimate cost of engaging 
in a business that causes harm to others”). 
28 Id. at 114. 
29 See id. at app. 1. 
30 Id. at 122. 
31 Id. 
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As we know from the subsequent passage of the DMCA, which 
contains safe harbors for providers of four32 discrete types of online 
activities, Congress did not follow the IITF’s recommendation to 
leave online service providers fully exposed to liability for the 
copyright infringements of their subscribers.  Congress did, however, 
incorporate into the structure of the DMCA’s safe harbors the 
significant distinction the IITF saw between online service providers 
that store material uploaded by users and those that merely route and 
transmit material for users.33  Consistent with the IITF’s logic 
concerning which of the two types of providers is better situated to 
know and control what its subscribers are doing, Congress required 
more in the way of compliance under § 512 from providers acting like 
information publishers than it did from providers acting like 
information conduits.34  Providers that act more like publishers—
those that store information in a persistent way at the direction of 
users—are subject to the “notice and takedown” regime set forth in § 
512(c) of the DMCA.35  By contrast, providers that act more like 
conduits or common carriers—those that route and transmit 
information without modifying it or storing it more than fleetingly—
are governed by § 512(a), which does not predicate eligibility for the 
safe harbor on compliance with § 512(c)’s notice and takedown 
regime.36 
 
32 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2006) (governing transitory digital network communications); id. 
§ 512(b) (governing system caching); id. § 512(c) (governing information residing on 
systems or networks at the direction of users); id. § 512(d) (governing information location 
tools). 
33 See id. § 512(a) (governing transitory digital network communications); id. § 512(c) 
(governing information residing on systems or networks at direction of users). 
34 Compare id. § 512(a) with id. § 512(c).  See also Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., Inc. 
v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 1234 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“Notably present in 
§§ 512(b)–(d), and notably absent from § 512(a), is the so-called notice and take-down 
provision.”). 
35 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A). 
36 See id. § 512(a); In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 393 F.3d 771, 776 (8th Cir. 2005) 
(noting that Section 512(a) does not require compliance with the DMCA’s notice and 
takedown provisions); Io Grp., Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1147 
(N.D. Cal. 2008) (explaining that “[t]he statute itself is structured in a way that 
distinguishes between so-called ‘conduit only’ functions under Section 512(a) and those 
functions addressed by Section 512(c) (and other subsections as well)”). 
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B.  Obligations of Conduit Providers: § 512(a) and (i) 
Further differentiating “conduit” service providers from other 
service providers eligible under § 512’s safe harbors, Congress 
specifically defined § 512(a) providers in § 512(k): 
As used in subsection (a), the term “service provider” means an 
entity offering the transmission, routing, or providing of 
connections for digital online communications, between or among 
points specified by a user, of material of the user’s choosing, 
without modification to the content of the material as sent or 
received.37 
In order for an ISP that meets the definition in § 512(k) to come 
within the protection of the safe harbor in § 512(a), five conditions 
must be met, all of which have to do with the ISP’s functioning like a 
common carrier—providing, in the words of the IITF, “only the wires 
and conduits”38 through which someone else’s information travels: 
(1) the transmission must be initiated by someone other than the 
provider; (2) the transmission must be “carried out through an 
automatic technical process without selection of the material by the 
service provider;” (3) the provider must not select the recipient of the 
transmission; (4) the provider must not maintain a copy of the 
material on its system for longer than is necessary to transmit it; and 
(5) the material must be transmitted “without modification of its 
content.”39 
Although conduit ISPs that fall within the scope of § 512(a)’s 
protections for providers of transitory digital network 
communications are not required to comply with the DMCA’s notice 
and takedown framework, all defendants seeking safe harbor under § 
512 are subject to conditions for eligibility set forth in § 512(i).40  
Section 512(i) requires service providers to (1) adopt a policy that 
provides for the termination of access for repeat infringers in 
appropriate circumstances, (2) implement that policy in a reasonable 
manner, and (3) inform its subscribers of the policy.41  It also requires 
service providers to accommodate and “not interfere with standard 
 
37 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(A). 
38 LEHMAN, supra note 22, at 122. 
39 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(1)–(5). 
40 Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 481 F.3d 751, 758 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that “[t]o 
be eligible for any of the four safe harbors at §§ 512(a)–(d), a service provider must first 
meet the threshold conditions set out in § 512(i)”). 
41 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A); Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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technical measures” used by copyright owners to identify and protect 
their works.42 
Compared to the detailed notice and takedown framework from § 
512(c), the requirements of § 512(i) are much more loosely defined.  
For example, the statute provides no definition of “repeat infringer” 
and is silent as to what “appropriate circumstances” for termination of 
access might be.43  The statute does not define what it means for a 
policy to be “reasonably implemented,” nor does it specify the means 
by which an ISP is expected to “inform subscribers” of its policy.  As 
one court has observed, “the language of the statute and the legislative 
history of this section are less than models of clarity.”44  Courts asked 
to decide copyright infringement claims in which defendant ISPs have 
asserted one or more of the § 512 safe harbors have thus been forced 
as a matter of statutory construction to give more definite content to § 
512(i) than Congress did when it drafted the DMCA.  In doing so, 
they have been guided by a legislative history expressing 
Congressional intent to preserve strong incentives for service 
providers to cooperate with rights owners.45  At the same time, 
however, they are bound to interpret § 512(i)’s requirements within 
the limits of § 512(m), the DMCA’s privacy provision, which 
expressly precludes courts from construing any provision in § 512 to 
condition safe harbor eligibility on “a service provider monitoring its 
service or affirmatively seeking facts indicating infringing activity.”46  
So, while § 512(i) was designed to promote cooperation between 
rights owners and ISPs in online copyright enforcement, it cannot be 
 
42 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(B). 
43 See generally Andres Sawicki, Repeat Infringement in the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1455 (2006).  In UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh 
Networks Inc., the court declined to hold that termination of a user’s access was required 
after a second notice when the first notice identified multiple alleged infringements.  UMG 
Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1118 (C.D. Cal. 2009).  
The notices in the case were generated by the copyright owner using Audible Magic’s 
filtering system.  Id. 
44 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1176 (C.D. Cal. 
2002). 
45 See In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 393 F.3d 771, 782 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting the 
legislative history of the DMCA to establish that “Congress wanted to create ‘strong 
incentives for service providers and copyright owners to cooperate to detect and deal with 
copyright infringements that take place in the digital networked environment’” (quoting S. 
REP. NO. 105-190, at 40 (1998))). 
46 17 U.S.C. § 512(m)(1). 
 92 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89, 81 
read in light of § 512(m) to impose on qualifying ISPs any affirmative 
duty to monitor or investigate.47 
An additional limitation on what can be required of qualifying 
providers under § 512(i) is the DMCA’s narrow definition of the 
types of standard technical measures that providers must 
accommodate in order to qualify for safe harbor.48  Such measures 
must “have been developed pursuant to a broad consensus of 
copyright owners and service providers in an open, fair, voluntary, 
multi-industry standards process;”49 they must be “available to any 
person on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms;”50 and they must 
“not impose substantial costs on service providers or substantial 
burdens on their systems or networks.”51  Perhaps because the 
incentives of the parties whose consensus is required have historically 
been misaligned, the standard technical measures provision of § 
512(i) has not yet resulted in any concrete obligations for providers—
although this may now be changing for reasons that are discussed at 
length in Part II of this Article.52 
Given the express limitation established in § 512(m) concerning 
the burdens and costs that can legitimately be imposed on providers 
seeking safe harbor, courts have produced carefully calibrated 
interpretations of the reach of § 512(i), most in the context of 
defenses raised under § 512(c).  For example, in Corbis Corp. v. 
Amazon.com, Inc.,53 the court held that a properly adopted 
termination policy need not precisely track the language of the 
DMCA, and it need not disclose to users the precise criteria the 
provider will apply to determine when termination of access is 
appropriate.54  Such a policy must, however, convey to users “who 
repeatedly or flagrantly abuse their access to the [I]nternet through 
disrespect for the intellectual property rights of others” that they face 
 
47 See, e.g., Io Grp., Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1145 (N.D. Cal. 
2008) (stating that “section 512(i) does not require service providers to track users in a 
particular way or to affirmatively police users for evidence of repeat infringement”). 
48 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(2) (defining “standard technical measures”). 
49 Id. § 512(i)(2)(A). 
50 Id. § 512(i)(2)(B). 
51 Id. § 512(i)(2)(C). 
52 See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 
12B.02[B][3] (2006) (expressing doubt that the provision will ever lead to concrete 
obligations, given the incentives of the parties). 
53 Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2004). 
54 Id. at 1101–02. 
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“a realistic threat of losing that access.”55  In Perfect 10, Inc. v. 
Cybernet Ventures, Inc.,56 the court held that determining appropriate 
circumstances for termination does not require investigation by the 
provider into individual acts of infringement; however, the provider 
must act when it receives “sufficient evidence to create actual 
knowledge of blatant, repeat infringement by particular users, 
particularly infringement of a willful and commercial nature.”57 
Courts have not spoken with one voice when it comes to what and 
how much § 512(i) specifically requires of safe-harbor-seeking 
providers.  While courts seem to agree that § 512(i) requires providers 
to have in place a system for receiving notices of infringement from 
rights owners,58 they have reached differing conclusions concerning 
whether multiple notices of infringement from a copyright owner are 
sufficient, on their own, to justify charging a provider with actual 
knowledge of a particular user’s blatant, repeat infringement.59  And 
some courts have held that something less than actual knowledge of 
blatant infringement can establish circumstances requiring 
termination under § 512(i) because § 512(i) should be read to 
incorporate § 512(c)’s “red flag” test.60  Under the red flag test, a 
service provider may lose safe harbor if it fails to act when it is 
“aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is 
 
55 Id. at 1101 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 44 (1998)). 
56 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
57 Id. at 1177. 
58 See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 481 F.3d 751, 758 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding 
that § 512(i) requires “a working notification system”); Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 
1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that a reasonable jury could conclude that 
implementation of a termination policy is not reasonable where notices of infringement 
have gone unheeded by the provider); Corbis Corp., 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1102 (holding that 
§ 512(i) requires adoption and implementation of a procedure for receiving complaints and 
conveying them to users). 
59 Compare Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1088 (C.D. Cal. 
2004) (concluding that “an internet service provider who receives repeat notifications that 
substantially comply with the requirements of § 512(c)(3)(A) about one of its clients, but 
does not terminate its relationship with the client, has not reasonably implemented a repeat 
infringer policy”), rev’d on other grounds, 481 F.3d 751, with Corbis Corp., 351 F. Supp. 
2d at 1105 (concluding that notices from a copyright owner function to bring a potential 
infringement to the provider’s attention, but do not, in themselves, provide evidence of 
blatant copyright infringement because they could be erroneous). 
60 See CCBill LLC, 481 F.3d at 763; Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc., 633 F. 
Supp. 2d 124, 142 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
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apparent”61 (i.e., when it has constructive knowledge of 
infringement). 
Because all providers seeking safe harbor under § 512 are subject 
to § 512(i), the incorporation of the notice and red flag provisions 
from § 512(c) into § 512(i) seems to implicate providers invoking § 
512(a), even though it is clear on the face of the statute that they are 
not subject to the notice and takedown regime in § 512(c).  Reading § 
512(i) in a way that effectively makes elements of § 512(c) binding 
on all providers seeking safe harbor, including those invoking § 
512(a), undermines the DMCA’s scheme for imposing different and 
less onerous conditions for eligibility under § 512(a) (i.e., for conduit 
providers) than are imposed under § 512(b), (c), and (d), all of which 
expressly require compliance with the notice and takedown regime.62  
Moreover, such a reading is at odds with the established canon of 
construction that the meaning of individual statutory provisions 
should be interpreted in light of the statute as a whole.63 
Taking into account the language of § 512(a), (i), (k), and (m) and 
the court decisions interpreting § 512(i) to incorporate elements from 
§ 512(c), the requirements that must be met by an ISP seeking safe 
harbor under § 512(a) can be summarized as follows:  First, the ISP 
must function solely as a conduit for the data communications of its 
users, in the same way that phone companies acting as common 
carriers historically functioned with respect to the voice 
communications of their users.  In other words, it cannot select the 
material it transmits or in any way modify the content of that material.  
Second, it must comply with the requirements of § 512(i) concerning 
the termination of repeat infringers and accommodation of standard 
technical measures.  Under the reading of § 512(i) that incorporates 
the “red flag” provisions from § 512(c), a provider invoking § 512(a) 
that actually knows or should know of blatant, repeat infringement by 
a particular user (i.e., “appropriate circumstances”) must terminate the 
access of that user in order to show that it has “reasonably 
implemented” its repeat infringer policy.  Finally, although the 
provider is not required to investigate or monitor its service to 
identify repeat infringers, it is required to have a process in place for 
 
61 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2006). 
62 See id. § 512(b)(2)(E), (d)(3) (conditioning eligibility on compliance with § 
512(c)(3)). 
63 K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (“In ascertaining the plain 
meaning of the statute, the court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as 
well as the language and design of the statute as a whole.”). 
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receiving and conveying to users notices of infringement sent by 
rights owners. 
C.  Conduit Providers, Repeat Infringers, and Graduated Response 
Because the case law is mixed on the very important question of 
whether notices from rights owners, by themselves, can create 
requisite knowledge for the provider that a particular user is a repeat 
infringer, the most conservative course of action for a provider 
invoking § 512(a) is to terminate access for any user who is the 
subject of multiple notices of infringement from a copyright owner.  
This is, as it happens, consistent with the “three strikes” permutation 
of graduated response described in the opening paragraph above.  In 
this particular division of labor, monitoring and notification are 
carried out by the copyright owner, and the sanction is imposed by the 
ISP at the behest of the copyright owner.  From the provider’s point 
of view, terminating any customer’s access is a distasteful prospect 
because every user’s continued access translates into revenue for the 
provider and users whose access is terminated can usually take their 
business to a competitor.  From the user’s point of view, termination 
at the behest of an aggrieved rights owner or owners without any 
neutral adjudication of the merits of the claims seems biased and 
unfair.  It creates the impression that the provider has been co-opted 
by rights owners whose interests appear to be more important than the 
interests of the ISP’s own customers. 
The interpretation of § 512(i) that equates receipt of repeat notices 
of infringement with knowledge by the ISP that its user is a repeat 
infringer allows the copyright owner to be judge and jury for purposes 
of determining whose access the ISP must terminate in order to stay 
within the safe harbor.  In effect, this reading of § 512(i) makes 
compliance with a “three strikes and you’re out” form of graduated 
response, or something very like it, a precondition for safe harbor 
eligibility under § 512(a).  The provider finds itself caught between 
Scylla and Charybdis: if it fails to terminate a user’s access after 
receiving repeat notices of infringement from a copyright owner, it 
faces the loss of the safe harbor for not having reasonably 
implemented its termination policy; if, on the other hand, it terminates 
a user’s access on the copyright owner’s say-so, it faces the loss of a 
customer, which is especially troubling if the claims of infringement 
turn out to be misdirected or non-meritorious.  Moreover, wrongful 
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terminations might themselves create the potential for provider 
liability to customers for breach of contract. 
The DMCA, which was drafted with the stated purpose of 
balancing the interests of rights owners and online providers, should 
not be read to put the provider in such a bind.  The judicial 
interpretation of § 512(i) that better preserves the policy balance 
struck by Congress when it adopted the DMCA is one that requires 
something more than notices of infringement generated by rights 
owners before the provider can be charged with knowledge that a 
particular user is a repeat infringer.64  Such additional evidence 
should be required especially when it comes to § 512(a) ISPs, which 
by definition lack knowledge of what is passing through their 
networks at any given time.  Because § 512(a) providers are in less of 
a position to know what their users are transmitting than § 512(c) 
providers are to know what they are storing on behalf of their users, 
knowledge should not as readily be imputed to § 512(a) providers.  
Even the IITF, which opposed any limitation of liability for ISPs, 
appreciated that the two types of providers are on a different footing 
in terms of their relationships to their customers’ data.  Interpreting § 
512(i) to impose § 512(c)’s notice and “red flag” elements on § 
512(a) providers ignores the architecture of the DMCA and collapses 
definitional distinctions between the two types of providers that are 
plain on the statute’s face. 
D.  Conduit Providers, P2P Architecture, and the Limits of the DMCA 
The fact that elements from § 512(c), which governs the storage of 
user-supplied information, figure so prominently in judicial 
interpretations of § 512(i), which also governs conduit ISPs, is 
symptomatic of the DMCA’s underlying assumption of a specific 
technological state of the art.65  The statute was designed, as Niva 
Elkin-Koren and others have observed, to address a centralized 
network architecture in which communication among users is 
 
64 See Corbis Corp., 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1105–06; UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh 
Networks Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1118 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
65 Niva Elkin-Koren, Making Technology Visible: Liability of Internet Service 
Providers for Peer-to-Peer Traffic, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 15, 41 (2006); see 
also Mike Scott, Safe Harbors Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 9 N.Y.U. J. 
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 99, 137 (2006) (arguing that “the statute . . . embodies particular 
normative and descriptive notions about how digital networks should work, as well as how 
they actually do work”). 
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mediated by the ISP acting as a host for uploaded files.66  Before the 
advent of P2P file sharing, storage on behalf of users—the function 
covered by § 512(c)—was the most copyright-relevant function an 
ISP performed.  In P2P networks, however, files exchanged between 
users are never uploaded to an ISP’s server; instead, they remain at all 
times on the users’ own computers, from which they are directly 
copied by other users.67  In this architecture, the most copyright-
relevant functions an ISP performs are routing and transmission—the 
functions covered by § 512(a).  Because the DMCA was designed 
primarily to deal with ISPs serving a centralized file storage function, 
it has proven to be a poor fit in cases involving P2P, where the ISP 
functions only as a conduit for the transfer of infringing material.  
This poor fit is perhaps best exemplified in the cases involving § 
512(h), the DMCA’s expedited subpoena provision, which rights 
owners sought to use at the peak of the file sharing phenomenon to 
compel conduit ISPs to reveal the identities of allegedly infringing 
users of P2P software.68 
Section 512(h) permits a copyright owner to obtain a subpoena 
outside the context of litigation to identify an alleged infringer.69  In 
order for the subpoena to issue, the copyright owner must submit to 
the clerk of the court a request consisting of three documents: a copy 
of the notification described in § 512(c)(3)(A); a proposed subpoena; 
and a sworn declaration that the subpoena is being sought “to obtain 
the identity of an alleged infringer and that such information will only 
be used for the purpose of protecting” a copyright.70  The notification 
described in § 512(c)(3)(A), in order to be compliant with the 
statute’s requirements, must identify, among other things, “the 
material that is claimed to be infringing . . . and that is to be removed 
or access to which is to be disabled” by the ISP.71 
 
66 See Elkin-Koren, supra note 65, at 41; see also Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., Inc. 
v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (referring to the 
establishment of “unauthorized FTP or BBS sites on the servers of ISPs”). 
67 See generally A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 
2001) (explaining how a P2P system works). 
68 See In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 393 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2005); Verizon Internet 
Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229. 
69 17 U.S.C. § 512(h) (2006); see also In re Subpoena to Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 
367 F. Supp. 2d 945, 958 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (referring to a DMCA subpoena as a 
“prelitigation subpoena”). 
70 17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(1)–(2). 
71 Id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii). 
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Unlike § 512(i), which contains no reference on its face to § 
512(c), but which has been interpreted nevertheless to incorporate that 
section’s notice and “red flag” elements, § 512(h) does expressly 
incorporate § 512(c)’s notice element.72  Whereas courts interpreting 
§ 512(i) have construed it in a way that makes elements of § 512(c) 
applicable “through the back door” to § 512(a) providers, the D.C. 
Circuit and the Eighth Circuit have declined to read § 512(h) to do 
this.73  In reaching the conclusion that the subpoena power in § 
512(h) does not extend to § 512(a) providers, both courts found it 
dispositive that § 512(c)’s notice and takedown requirements apply on 
the face of the statute to providers that store information but not to 
those that act simply as a conduit for it.74  This differentiation by 
function—host providers vs. conduit providers—makes sense 
considering that providers storing information for users have control 
over that information by virtue of the fact that it resides on their 
systems in a more-than-transient way.75  Host providers are therefore 
able, as § 512(c)(3)(A) contemplates, to remove or disable access to 
that information upon notification that the information is infringing.76  
Providers that merely transmit information for users, by contrast, do 
not control the information that is being transmitted over their 
systems and cannot remove or disable access to it.77  They can 
 
72 See id. § 512(h)(2)(A). 
73 See Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d at 1236 (holding that section 512(h) does 
not by its terms authorize the issuance of subpoenas to section 512(a) providers); Charter 
Commc’ns, Inc., 393 F.3d at 777. 
74 See Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 393 F.3d at 777 (holding that “because . . . Charter’s 
function was limited to acting as a conduit for the allegedly copyright protected material, 
we agree § 512(h) does not authorize the subpoenas issued here”); Verizon Internet Servs., 
Inc., 351 F.3d at 1236–37 (“We agree that the presence in § 512(h) of three separate 
references to § 512(c) and the absence of any reference to § 512(a) suggests the subpoena 
power of § 512(h) applies only to ISPs engaged in storing copyrighted material and not to 
those engaged solely in transmitting it on behalf of others.”). 
75 See Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 393 F.3d at 776 (explaining that each safe harbor that 
covers a function allowing the ISP to remove or disable access to infringing material (i.e., 
storage, system caching, or linking) contains a remove-or-disable access provision). 
76 See id. (explaining that each safe harbor provision that covers a function allowing the 
ISP to remove or disable access to content refers to the notification provision in section 
512(c)); In re Subpoena to Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 367 F. Supp. 2d 945, 949 
(M.D.N.C. 2005) (explaining that “[t]he notification in subsection (c)(3) presumes that the 
information is stored on a provider’s system”). 
77 See Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 393 F.3d at 776 (explaining that the absence of the 
notification and remove-or-disable-access provisions from section 512(a) “makes sense 
where an ISP merely acts as a conduit for infringing material . . . because the ISP has no 
ability to remove the infringing material from its system or disable access to the infringing 
material”). 
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terminate Internet access for specific users by blocking their IP 
addresses, as § 512(i) requires them to do, but they cannot disable 
access to the allegedly infringing material itself, as § 512(c) requires.  
Taking into account the necessary relationship between an ISP’s 
control over stored information and its ability to remove or disable 
access to that information upon receipt of a DMCA-compliant notice, 
the D.C. Circuit held in Recording Industry Ass’n of America, Inc. v. 
Verizon Internet Services, Inc.78 that “the text of § 512(h) and the 
overall structure of § 512 clearly establish . . . that § 512(h) does not 
authorize the issuance of a subpoena to an ISP acting as a mere 
conduit for the transmission of information sent by others.”79  The 
Eighth Circuit later reached the same conclusion in In re Charter 
Communications, Inc.80 
With the conclusion that § 512(a) providers are not subject to the 
subpoena power created by § 512(h) because they do not store 
information for users, rights owners lost what would have been an 
efficient means of identifying infringing P2P file sharers for the 
purpose of initiating settlement negotiations or taking other steps to 
enforce their rights.  Without the power to issue pre-litigation 
subpoenas to conduit ISPs under the authority of § 512(h), rights 
owners have been required to go to the trouble and expense of filing 
John Doe lawsuits in order to learn the identities of alleged 
infringers.81  In the Verizon case, the RIAA argued that a narrow 
interpretation of § 512(h) “would defeat the core objectives” of the 
DMCA.82  The court wrote that it was not unsympathetic to the need 
for legal tools to protect copyright owners from widespread 
infringement, but it could not, it said, rewrite the DMCA to provide 
 
78 Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229. 
79 Id. at 1237. 
80 Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 393 F.3d 771. 
81 After filing a “John Doe” lawsuit for copyright infringement, the copyright owner can 
subpoena the identity of the alleged infringer pursuant to Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.  See, e.g., Virgin Records Am., Inc. v. Doe, No. 5:08-CV-389-D, 2009 
WL 700207 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 16, 2009) (denying the defendant’s motion to quash a Rule 45 
subpoena issued after the filing of a John Doe lawsuit alleging copyright infringement by 
means of a P2P network). 
82 Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d at 1238; see also In re Subpoena to Univ. of 
N.C. at Chapel Hill, 367 F. Supp. 2d 945, 953 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (“While the RIAA’s 
argument at first blush is tempting, the Court rejects it because it would necessarily 
amount to the rewriting of the statute.”). 
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for a technology that Congress had no reason to foresee when it 
drafted the statute.83 
In a dissent from the Eighth Circuit’s decision in the Charter case, 
Judge Murphy criticized the majority’s decision “to block copyright 
holders from obtaining effective protection against infringement 
through conduit service providers.”84  He asserted that the majority’s 
interpretation of § 512(h) “shields conduit ISPs from liability without 
requiring their assistance in protecting copyrights.”85  This contention 
is not strictly accurate, given that conduit ISPs in the wake of the 
Verizon and Charter decisions are still required to comply with 
subpoenas to identify alleged infringers when those subpoenas are 
issued in the context of pending litigation.  There is no question, 
however, that the narrow interpretation of § 512(h) has made it both 
more time-consuming and more expensive for rights owners to 
enforce their copyrights in cases where the ISP acts only as a conduit 
and not as a host for the infringing material.86 
E.  The DMCA and the Prehistory of Graduated Response 
Taken together, court decisions interpreting the DMCA and 
defining the specific obligations of ISPs seeking safe harbor under it 
have laid the groundwork for graduated response in two important 
ways.  First, the decisions that interpret § 512(i) to incorporate § 
512(c)’s notice and red flag provisions suggest that implementing a 
“three strikes and you’re out” protocol or some near variant is 
sufficient, if not necessary, to qualify a conduit provider for safe 
harbor under § 512(a).  While the decisions are silent as to how many 
“strikes” a given user should get before he or she is labeled a repeat 
infringer, and while they are equivocal as to what information must be 
counted by an ISP as a strike, they clearly establish that § 512(i) 
requires not only the adoption of a repeat infringer policy but also 
proof in the form of terminated or suspended users that the policy is 
actually enforced. 
Second, the decisions interpreting § 512(h) to exclude conduit 
providers from the reach of pre-litigation subpoenas have foreclosed 
 
83 Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d at 1238. 
84 Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 393 F.3d at 778 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
85 Id. at 782. 
86 See id. (asserting that “John Doe actions are costly and time consuming” and that 
Congress did not intend that “copyright holders should be relegated to such cumbersome 
and expensive measures against conduit ISPs”). 
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the statutory means by which rights owners could have made direct 
contact with alleged P2P infringers outside the context of litigation.  
This limitation has led rights owners to pursue private arrangements 
for “reaching through” to alleged P2P infringers.  In 2005, the same 
year the Eighth Circuit decided Charter, Verizon entered into an 
agreement with Disney to forward notices of infringement, in return 
for which it received the right to transmit certain Disney 
programming over its network.87  In late 2009, Verizon reached a 
notice-forwarding agreement with the RIAA.88  In addition to these 
two agreements, Verizon is reportedly a party to a number of other, 
undisclosed agreements to forward notices on behalf of content 
providers.89  Private arrangements such as these have the benefit for 
rights owners of being less public and more efficient than the filing of 
John Doe lawsuits.  To the extent that copyright owners can convince 
conduit ISPs to serve as their conduits, forwarding notices of 
infringement to users whose IP addresses they have linked to 
infringing activity, they can communicate with alleged P2P infringers 
in a way that avoids litigation and obviates the privacy concerns 
associated with asking ISPs to disclose their users’ identities. 
Given users’ resistance to the idea that their ISPs will embrace 
graduated response and begin functioning actively as Big Content’s 
copyright cops, ISPs tend to tread very gingerly when it comes to 
public statements about their participation in graduated response 
programs.  Representatives of major broadband providers including 
Comcast, Cox, and AT&T have denied publicly that they are 
participating in a “three strikes” program in cooperation with the 
RIAA.90  At the same time, however, a Comcast executive disclosed 
that the company issues between one million and two million 
infringement notices per year to subscribers on behalf of copyright 
owners.91  The executive, who couched his comments expressly in 
terms of DMCA compliance, said that forwarding notices of 
infringement to customers is nothing new for Comcast.92  He also 
 
87 Nate Anderson, Verizon to Forward RIAA Warning Letters (But That’s All), ARS 
TECHNICA, Nov. 13, 2009, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/11/verizon-to     
-forward-riaa-warning-letters-but-thats-all.ars. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Albanesius, supra note 17. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
 102 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89, 81 
acknowledged that Comcast has suspended the accounts of a small 
fraction of users in connection with the company’s DMCA 
compliance efforts.93  Cox representatives have admitted to having 
done the same in a small number of cases where repeated notices have 
gone unheeded by subscribers.94  Verizon, for its part, has been 
equivocal concerning whether it has ever imposed service 
interruptions on alleged infringers.95 
Although the impulse of broadband executives is to run the other 
way when they are confronted with questions from the media about 
“three strikes” and graduated response,96 the fact of the matter is that 
broadband providers, in the name of the DMCA, have been engaged 
for a number of years in a form of graduated response avant la lettre: 
they have entered into arrangements with rights owners pursuant to 
which they forward notices of infringement to subscribers, and at 
least two major ISPs—Comcast and Cox—are on the record as having 
suspended access for subscribers who routinely receive and ignore 
such notices.  Given the lack of clarity in court rulings interpreting § 
512(i) as applied to conduit providers, what Comcast and Cox have 
done in cases where subscribers have ignored repeated notices is a 
cautious but not unreasonable approach to DMCA compliance. 
Even when the lingering ambiguities concerning the precise 
obligations of conduit providers under § 512(i) are taken into account, 
it is plain on the face of the DMCA that no broadband provider can 
qualify for safe harbor if its policies do not provide for termination of 
access for repeat copyright infringers.  This has been true since 1998.  
Accordingly, the terms of use for every major broadband provider 
contain a provision reserving the right to terminate access for any user 
 
93 Id. 
94 Sarah McBride, Relationship Status of RIAA and ISPs: It’s Complicated, WALL ST. 
J., Mar. 26, 2009, http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2009/03/26/relationship-status-of-riaa-and    
-isps-its-complicated/. 
95 See Nate Anderson, Verizon: We’re Not Cutting Off Users Over Copyright Claims, 
ARS TECHNICA, Jan. 21, 2010, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/01/verizon    
-uh-we-arent-cutting-off-users-over-copyright-claims.ars (reporting that Verizon first 
admitted to and then denied having “cut some people off”). 
96 See David Kravets, Top Internet Providers Cool to RIAA 3-Strikes Plan, WIRED, Jan. 
5, 2009, http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/01/draft-verizon-o/ (“Two weeks after the 
Recording Industry Association of America announced it had struck deals with top internet 
service providers to cut off unrepentant music sharers, not a single major ISP will cop to 
agreeing to the ambitious scheme, and one top broadband company says it’s not on 
board.”). 
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who infringes copyrights.97  Verizon and Comcast expressly reserve 
the right to do so unilaterally (i.e., in their “sole discretion”).  In this 
sense, the most controversial element of graduated response, ISP-
initiated termination of user access, has been part of the mix in online 
copyright enforcement for a good while, and the current controversy 
over the prospect that an ISP might suspend a user’s access for 
repeated violations of copyright law seems belated. 
II 
“MERE CONDUITS” NO MORE: BROADBAND PROVIDERS, 
INTELLIGENT NETWORKS, AND THE END OF PASSIVE CARRIAGE 
What is relatively new, however, and what is changing the post-
DMCA copyright enforcement calculus for content owners, 
broadband providers, and their customers is the increasingly routine 
deployment of “smart” technology within broadband networks.98  
 
97 See, e.g., AT&T High Speed Internet Terms of Service, AT&T, 
http://www.att.net/csbellsouth/s/s.dll?spage=cg/legal/att.htm&leg=tos (last updated June 
14, 2009) (“AT&T may, however, immediately terminate or suspend your Member 
Account and Sub Accounts, and all or a portion of your Service without notice if . . . you   
. . . engage in conduct that is a violation of any law, regulation or tariff (including, without 
limitation, copyright and intellectual property laws).”); Comcast Acceptable Use Policy 
For High-Speed Internet Services, COMCAST.NET, http://www.comcast.net/terms/use/ (last 
updated Jan. 1, 2009) [hereinafter Comcast Acceptable Use Policy] (“It is Comcast’s 
policy in accordance with the DMCA and other applicable laws to reserve the right to 
terminate the Service provided to any customer or user who is either found to infringe 
third party copyright or other intellectual property rights, including repeat infringers, or 
who Comcast, in its sole discretion, believes is infringing these rights.  Comcast may 
terminate the Service at any time with or without notice for any affected customer or 
user.”); Verizon Internet Access Terms of Service, VERIZON, http://www.verizon.net 
/central/vzc.portal?_nfpb=true&_pageLabel=vzc_help_policies&id=TOS (last updated 
Jan. 17, 2010) [hereinafter Verizon Terms of Service] (“In accordance with the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) and other applicable laws, it is the policy of Verizon 
to suspend or terminate, in appropriate circumstances, the Service provided to any 
subscriber or account holder who is deemed to infringe third party intellectual property 
rights, including repeat infringers of copyrights.  In addition, Verizon expressly reserves 
the right to suspend, terminate or take other interim action regarding the Service of any 
Subscriber or account holder if Verizon, in its sole judgment, believes that circumstances 
relating to an infringement of third party intellectual property rights warrant such action.”). 
98 As Paul Ohm explains: 
Because ISPs have the means, thanks to recent advances in monitoring 
technology, motive—financial turmoil coupled with pressures to use new 
technologies to raise revenue and assist third parties—and opportunity—
ownership of the network bottleneck—they have begun to embrace new forms of 
aggressive monitoring.  In the past year in particular, the headlines have been 
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Technologies like deep packet inspection (DPI) have given broadband 
operators an unprecedented level of control over the content that 
flows through their “pipes.”99  DPI gives broadband providers the 
ability to look beyond the header of a data packet, which contains 
routing information, and into the packet’s payload, which is the actual 
data inside the packet.100  The uses of DPI are multifarious, and the 
reasons for which broadband providers have implemented the 
technology are at most tangentially related to copyright enforcement.  
DPI can be used, for example, for detection and filtering of viruses 
and malware, management of network congestion (which is caused, in 
part, by P2P traffic), traffic sorting (in support of service tiering or 
prioritization), and data mining (in support of behavioral 
advertising).101  It can also be used for law enforcement purposes, as 
required by the Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act 
(CALEA), to capture and transmit data to government agents.102 
Although copyright enforcement is not the reason for which 
broadband operators have implemented DPI technology within their 
networks, blocking unauthorized transmissions of copyrighted content 
 
filled with stories about ISPs conducting or proposing invasive new monitoring.  
This has happened at a breathtaking pace and suggests an undeniable trend. 
Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1417, 
1432 (2009). 
 The powerful surveillance tools to which Ohm refers are the product of a technological 
evolution in network intelligence that began in the early 2000s.  See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley 
& Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in 
the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925, 939 (2001) (“While the [end-to-end] 
architecture of the Internet is fundamentally in place, users and network administrators are 
introducing intelligence into the network for a variety of reasons.  Firewalls, proxy servers, 
Network Address Translators (NATs), and other systems are designed to determine the 
content and origin of packets and discriminate between packets.”). 
99 See Matt Villano, Peering Deeply into Network Traffic, CRN, June 28, 2004, 
http://www.crn.com/security/22101663;jsessionid=BC10PXZ1W2T2DQE1GHPSKHWA
TMY32JVN (“This new technology, dubbed deep-packet inspection, scans every bit and 
byte of every piece of data as it crosses the network perimeter.”). 
100 Nate Anderson, Deep Packet Inspection Meets ‘Net Neutrality, CALEA, ARS 
TECHNICA, July 25, 2007, http://arstechnica.com/hardware/news/2007/07/Deep-packet      
-inspection-meets-net-neutrality.ars. 
101 See id. 
102 See Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), FED. COMM. 
COMMISSION, http://www.fcc.gov/calea/ (last updated Feb. 21, 2007) (“CALEA was 
intended to preserve the ability of law enforcement agencies to conduct electronic 
surveillance by requiring that telecommunications carriers and manufacturers of 
telecommunications equipment modify and design their equipment, facilities, and services 
to ensure that they have the necessary surveillance capabilities.”). 
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is a potential application for DPI.103  Using DPI, ISPs have the ability 
to automate and centralize the previously dispersed processes of 
monitoring, notice, and termination, which are the essential elements 
of graduated response.104  Paul Ohm predicts that ISPs, in response to 
technological changes and a desire to increase revenue, will use DPI 
to monitor more aggressively as time goes on, absent some regulatory 
or non-regulatory intervention.105  It is likely that copyright 
enforcement, for the reasons discussed below, will become part of this 
expanded monitoring trend. 
A key element of the negotiation strategy for rights owners seeking 
to partner with broadband providers in the implementation of a 
network-level solution to online piracy is the assertion that 
management of P2P traffic should be regarded as a matter of shared 
concern.  Content owners, not without success, have been selling the 
idea that broadband operators can help themselves manage network 
congestion by helping rights owners combat infringement.106  
Comcast’s highly controversial use of DPI in 2007 to throttle 
BitTorrent traffic is one manifestation of the coincidental community 
of interest that has developed between rights owners and network 
 
103 See What Your Broadband Provider Knows About Your Web Use: Deep Packet 
Inspection and Communications Laws and Policies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Telecomms. and the Internet of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 110th Cong. 7 
(2008) (statement of Alissa Cooper, Chief Computer Scientist, Center for Democracy & 
Technology), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/images/stories/Documents 
/Hearings/PDF/Testimony/TI/110-ti-hrg.071708.Cooper-testimony.pdf (listing detection 
of intellectual property among the many applications for DPI). 
104 Audible Magic markets a deep packet inspection appliance to colleges and 
universities that is tailored specifically to on-campus copyright enforcement.  See The 
Graduated Response System, AUDIBLE MAGIC, http://www.audiblemagic.com/products     
-services/copysense/graduated-response.asp (last visited Oct. 2, 2010) (“The Graduated 
Response system fully supports the three-strikes policies in place at many colleges and 
universities.  The [system] . . . automatically communicates graduating levels of responses. 
. . . The more times a user is caught, the more severe the sanctions.  Sanctions can also 
include the automatic blocking of network access for a particular user for a specified and 
graduated period of time.”). 
105 Ohm, supra note 98, at 1436–37. 
106 See Saul Hansell, Hollywood Wants Internet Providers to Block Copyrighted Files, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2008, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/25/hollywood-tries-to   
-get-support-for-having-isps-block-copyrighted-files/ (explaining that Internet providers 
like AT&T are potentially interested in content filtering as a way to reduce network traffic 
caused by the trading of video files); Brad Stone, AT&T and Other I.S.P.’s May Be Getting 
Ready to Filter, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2008, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/01/08/att      
-and-other-isps-may-be-getting-ready-to-filter/ (reporting on talks at the Consumer 
Electronics Show between representatives of NBC, Microsoft, AT&T, and content 
filtering companies). 
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operators with respect to the use of smart network technology to 
manage bandwidth-intensive P2P traffic.  In late 2007, Comcast was 
discovered to have been blocking BitTorrent transfers as a means of 
congestion management.107  In 2008, Comcast was sanctioned for this 
conduct by the FCC, though it argued in the proceedings that it was 
simply engaged in “legitimate network management.”108 
While the use of DPI for copyright enforcement purposes goes a 
giant step beyond ISPs’ existing agreements to forward notices of 
infringement on behalf of rights owners, there is a compelling legal 
reason for ISPs to consider the prospect seriously.  As broadband 
providers have abandoned the end-to-end model of data transit109 in 
favor of intrusive traffic management or shaping, their continuing 
eligibility for the “mere conduit” safe harbor in § 512(a) has become 
questionable.110  To the extent that their network management 
practices now entail active intervention at the level of content,111 ISPs 
have exposed themselves to copyright liability from which § 512(a) 
shielded them when they were content to be “dumb pipes.”112  The 
 
107 Bridy, supra note 8, at 598–99. 
108 See id. at 599. 
109 See, e.g., Jon M. Peha, The Benefits and Risks of Mandating Network Neutrality, and 
the Quest for a Balanced Policy, 1 INT’L J. OF COMM. 644, 646 (2007), available at 
http://ijoc.org/ojs/index.php/ijoc/article/viewFile/154/90 (“Traditionally, Internet packets 
were sent with equal priority and ‘best effort,’ i.e., with no guarantee of delivery. . . . 
Times have changed.  There are a variety of techniques through which networks can now 
favor some packets or packet streams over others.”) 
110 See Frieden, supra note 18, at 645. 
111 According to Sandvine, a Canadian provider of DPI hardware to ISPs worldwide, 
ninety percent of its 160 ISP customers use the technology to manage traffic on their 
networks.  Nate Anderson, DPI Vendor Says 90% of ISP Customers Engage in Traffic 
Discrimination, ARS TECHNICA, Aug. 3, 2009, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news 
/2009/08/network-neutrality-dead-in-practice-as-most-isps-throttle.ars. 
 The terms of service for Cox Communications high-speed Internet subscribers contain a 
network management provision that implies the use of DPI: 
Network management may include, without limitation, the following actions: rate 
limiting of email (as set forth in our email policies), rejection or removal of 
“spam” or otherwise unsolicited bulk email, port blocking, cybersecurity 
mechanisms (including identification and blocking of viruses, phishing sites and 
other malware), measuring subscriber bandwidth usage, traffic prioritization and 
protocol filtering. 
Cox Communications Policies: Subscriber Agreement, COX COMMUNICATIONS, 
http://ww2.cox.com/aboutus/policies.cox#sub (last updated July 1, 2010) [hereinafter Cox 
Communications Subscriber Agreement]. 
112 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(2), (b)(2)(A) (2006) (conditioning safe harbor eligibility on 
an ISP’s routing of data “without selection of the material by the service provider” and 
“without modification to its content”). 
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subsections that follow provide a brief history of common carriage, a 
discussion of copyright law’s special rules of (non)liability for 
passive carriers, and an exploration of the liability effects of ISPs’ 
transition to a “smart” model of data transit. 
A.  Common Carriage Historically 
The IITF’s analogy between conduit ISPs and the telephone 
company was particularly appropriate in the days before cable and 
fiber broadband, when users connected to the Internet via narrowband 
dial-up connections that used existing telephone lines to transmit 
data.113  Although the Internet in those days represented a 
technological advance so revolutionary that it seemed to some to defy 
regulation,114 it relied absolutely at its inception on an existing 
physical infrastructure whose operators (i.e., telephone companies) 
were subject to a quite old-fashioned regulatory paradigm: common 
carriage.115  Given the early Internet’s dependence on the telephone 
network, it is no surprise that the IITF and policy makers were eying 
the novel problem of copyright liability for ISPs through the familiar 
lens of common carriage.  A brief discussion of the history of 
common carrier regulation therefore provides a useful context for 
understanding the origins of the DMCA’s safe harbor for service 
providers that transmit or route materials for their customers (i.e., 
conduit ISPs). 
 
113 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY COMPETITION POLICY: 
FTC STAFF REPORT JUNE 2007, at 19 (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports 
/broadband/v070000report.pdf [hereinafter FTC STAFF REPORT] (explaining that “[f]rom 
[the Internet’s] creation to its early commercialization, most computer users connected . . . 
using a ‘narrowband’ dial-up telephone connection and a special modem to transmit data 
over the telephone system’s traditional copper wirelines”); see also Religious Tech. Ctr. v. 
Netcom On-line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1365 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 1995) 
(describing the Internet as “a collection of thousands of local, regional, and global Internet 
Protocol networks . . . tied together via telephone lines” (quoting David Bruning, Along 
the InfoBahn, ASTRONOMY, June 1995, at 74, 76)). 
114 See, e.g., David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in 
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1370 (1996) (asserting that the Internet “radically 
subverts the system of rule-making based on borders between physical spaces”). 
115 Kevin Werbach has characterized common carriage as “[t]he dominant 
communications regulatory paradigm of the twentieth century.”  Kevin Werbach, Only 
Connect, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1233, 1246 (2007). 
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The Communications Act of 1934, which created the FCC to 
regulate the nation’s growing telephone and telegraph industries,116 
defined “common carrier” circularly: “The term ‘common carrier’ . . . 
means any person engaged as a common carrier for hire, in interstate 
or foreign communication by wire or radio.”117  The unhelpful 
circularity of the statutory definition has been noted by academics and 
judges alike.118  Phil Nichols has attributed it to the existence of an 
ordinary meaning of “common carrier” in 1934, such that Congress 
saw no need to define it expressly in the statute.119  Whatever the 
Congressional motivation for failing to provide a precise definition of 
the term, courts were predictably called upon to fill the void, and they 
did so through recourse to the common law of common carriage.120 
At early common law, an assortment of businesses, including 
innkeepers, railroads, warehouses, package carriers, and ferry 
operators, were classified as common carriers.121  For the most part, 
these businesses, as the term denotes, carried people or goods from 
one place to another.122  Those not engaged in the act of carriage 
itself, for example innkeepers and warehouses, had a direct 
connection to the means of transportation or communication and, 
thereby, a close practical relationship to actual carriers.123  
Historically, the essential attributes of common carriage have been 
nondiscriminatory access for all served and indifference to the nature 
 
116 Susan Crawford discusses the passage of the Communications Act of 1934 in terms 
of the perceived failure of the Interstate Commerce Commission, whose job was mainly 
regulating the railroads, to attend to communications regulation, which had become its 
responsibility under the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910.  See Susan P. Crawford, Transporting 
Communications, 89 B.U. L. REV. 871, 880–81 (2009). 
117 47 U.S.C. § 153(10) (2006). 
118 See, e.g., Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 701 n.10 
(1979); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Verity Int’l, Ltd., 443 F.3d 48, 57 (2d Cir. 2006); Werbach, 
supra note 115, at 1247. 
119 Phil Nichols, Redefining ‘Common Carrier’: The FCC’s Attempt at Deregulation by 
Redefinition, 1987 DUKE L.J. 501, 511 (1987) (“The facial circularity of contemporary 
definitions of common carrier suggests that there was indeed an ‘ordinary sense’ of the 
phrase, so that Congress did not believe it needed to provide a precise definition.”). 
120 Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 533 F.2d 601, 
608 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (stating that “the circularity and uncertainty of the common carrier 
definitions set forth in the statute and regulations invite recourse to the common law of 
carriers”). 
121 Werbach, supra note 115, at 1246. 
122 Thomas B. Nachbar, The Public Network, 17 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 67, 76 
(2008), available at http://commlaw.cua.edu/res/docs/06_Nachbar.pdf. 
123 See id. at 102. 
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of the goods carried.124  These two requirements—frequently 
conflated under the rubric of nondiscrimination—have remained 
constant over time, even as the means of carriage have evolved and 
the nature of goods carried has become less tangible.  Whether the 
subject of carriage is tangible goods or electrical pulses, both at 
common law and in the regulatory framework that developed in its 
wake, control over the destination and contents of a “package” in the 
hands of a common carrier is, and at all times remains, with the 
sender.  In other words, the definitive function of the common carrier 
is passive transportation of someone else’s stuff. 
B.  Common Carriage and Broadband Access Providers 
Controversially, ISPs—including cable, DSL, and wireless 
broadband providers—have not been subject to the common carrier 
requirements that define the regulatory space for wire-based 
telephony.125  This (de)regulatory choice lies at the heart of the long-
 
124 See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Verity Int’l, Ltd., 443 F.3d 48, 58 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(explaining that “the definition of a common carrier coalesced into two requirements: (1) 
the entity holds itself out as undertaking to carry for all people indifferently; and (2) the 
entity carries its cargo without modification”); see also Nachbar, supra note 122, at 107 
(“Nondiscrimination has been implemented almost exclusively with regard to delivery of 
undifferentiated services, such as carriage . . . . The identity of the transported good is 
largely irrelevant.”); Werbach, supra note 115, at 1246 (explaining that “[a] common 
carrier cannot . . . differentiate in the treatment of similarly situated customers, evaluate 
the content of what it receives from its customers, or refuse to serve interested customers, 
even when that means building out its facilities to reach them”). 
125 See Crawford, supra note 116, at 901–02.  This state of affairs may change in the 
near future.  In June 2010, the FCC issued a notice of inquiry (NOI) seeking comment on 
the possible reclassification of the connectivity component of broadband service as a 
telecommunications service under Title II of the Telecommunications Act.  See Notice of 
Inquiry: In the Matter of Framework for Broadband Internet Service Before the Fed. 
Commc’ns Comm’n, GN Docket No. 10-127 (2010), available at http://www.fcc.gov 
/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2010/db0617/FCC-10-114A1.pdf [hereinafter Notice of 
Inquiry]. 
 The NOI seeks to define a “third way” between the aggressive regulation that has 
applied historically to wire line phone carriers and the essentially non-regulatory approach 
to broadband taken by the FCC during the Bush era.  See id. at 2 (seeking public comment 
on “a third way under which the Commission would . . . reaffirm that Internet information 
services should remain generally unregulated [and] identify the Internet connectivity 
service that is offered as part of wired broadband Internet service (and only this 
connectivity service) as a telecommunications service” (emphasis added)).  The meaning 
and potential consequences of the proposed reclassification are discussed below, in this 
subsection. 
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running net neutrality debate.126  Susan Crawford has intricately 
traced the demise of common carriage in the telecommunications 
context, a development that she finds troubling given the concept’s 
foundational place in telecommunications policy for the last 150 
years.127  This subsection contains an abbreviated version of the story 
Crawford tells, followed by an account of some important recent 
developments on the regulatory front. 
In 1996, when the Communications Act of 1934 was overhauled to 
bring it up to date with developing technologies, telephone companies 
were regulated as common carriers.128  When narrowband Internet 
access evolved into broadband access and phone companies began 
offering high-speed DSL service over their existing wire lines, they 
were still treated as common carriers.129  Cable operators, by contrast, 
were never regulated as common carriers.130  They were subject to a 
“light-touch” regulatory regime, because they were viewed as 
entertainment broadcasters that were not using public airwaves and 
were thus not subject to the public trustee obligations of over-the-air 
broadcasters.131  In addition, they functioned as one-way pipes, so 
they escaped common carriage requirements to which telephone 
companies were subjected as operators of two-way communications 
networks.132 
When cable operators began providing broadband Internet access, 
the FCC did not treat them for regulatory purposes in the same way 
that it treated DSL operators, which had inherited legacy common 
carriage obligations as a function of their historical provision of 
telephone services.  Instead, the FCC continued to treat cable 
companies as it had before their entry into the two-way 
communications business.133  In its landmark decision in National 
 
126 The contours of this debate are beyond the scope of this Article and have been well 
delineated elsewhere.  See, e.g., FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 113; Tim Wu, The 
Broadband Debate, A User’s Guide, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 69 (2004). 
127 Crawford, supra note 116, at 876 (arguing that “[c]urrent general-purpose 
communications law is failing us” because it “does not include non-discriminatory access 
to general-purpose communications”). 
128 Id. at 901. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 901–02. 
131 Id. at 902. 
132 Id. 
133 See, e.g., Adam Thierer, Are “Dumb Pipe” Mandates Smart Public Policy? Vertical 
Integration, Net Neutrality, and the Network Layers Model, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH 
TECH. L. 275, 280 (2005) (explaining that “telephone companies are governed under Title 
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Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services,134 
the Supreme Court upheld the FCC’s declaratory ruling that cable 
operators of broadband networks should be classified for regulatory 
purposes as information services and not as telecommunications 
services.135  The latter are subject to regulation under Title II of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996; the former are not.  The import of 
this decision was to exempt cable operators of broadband services 
from common carrier obligations, which are built into the statutory 
definition of telecommunications: “The term ‘telecommunications’ 
means the transmission, between or among points specified by the 
user, of information of the user’s choosing, without change in the 
form or content of the information as sent and received.”136  
Classification of cable broadband as an information service freed 
cable companies to manage the content flowing across their networks 
in ways that are not permitted to common carriers.  It also raised the 
stakes in the debate over net neutrality, with advocates of a free and 
open Internet predicting a new era of corporate control over online 
content. 
The Brand X decision, which reversed the Ninth Circuit’s holding 
that cable broadband service should be classified as a 
“telecommunications service” subject to mandatory Title II common 
carrier regulation,137 implicitly ratified an asymmetry in the 
regulation of broadband providers.  Following Brand X, cable 
broadband providers and DSL broadband providers were classified 
differently for regulatory purposes, despite the similarity in the 
services they provided (i.e., high-speed Internet access).  DSL 
broadband providers remained subject to legacy regulation as 
common carriers; cable broadband providers, classified as 
“information services,” were exempt from Title II requirements.  
Parity between the two types of providers was achieved, however, 
when the FCC ruled in 2005 that DSL broadband is also an 
“information service” within the meaning of the Telecommunications 
 
II of the Communications Act as common carriers . . . while cable providers operate under 
Title VI” and are not subject to common carrier obligations). 
134 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
135 Id. at 997 (holding that the FCC’s decision was a reasonable policy choice in light of 
a textual ambiguity in the Telecommunications Act). 
136 47 U.S.C. § 153(43) (2006). 
137 Brand X Internet Servs. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 345 F.3d 1120, 1129 (9th Cir. 
2003) (holding that “the transmission element of cable broadband service constitutes 
telecommunications service under the terms of the Communications Act”). 
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Act.138  That ruling was followed in 2007 by a ruling that broadband 
Internet access over wireless networks is also an “information 
service” for regulatory purposes.139  Taken together, Brand X and the 
two subsequent administrative rulings covering DSL and wireless 
effectively mark the end of telecommunications common carriage in 
the context of broadband Internet access. 
These rulings mean that all broadband providers, uniformly 
classified as “information services,” are relieved of the 
nondiscrimination requirements statutorily imposed on 
“telecommunications services” as common carriers under Title II.140  
Citing the FCC’s continuing authority to regulate broadband under 
Title I of the Telecommunications Act, FCC Chairman Julius 
Genachowski issued the Open Internet NPRM, mentioned in passing 
in the opening paragraph of this Article, in October 2009.  When the 
rule-making began, Comcast’s appeal of the FCC sanction imposed 
on it for blocking BitTorrent traffic was pending in the Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.141  In the appeal, Comcast challenged 
the FCC’s Title I jurisdiction to regulate cable broadband, despite 
dicta from Brand X stating that the FCC retained ancillary jurisdiction 
under Title I to “impose special regulatory duties on facilities-based 
ISPs.”142 
In a decision that pulled the rug out from under the FCC and the 
Open Internet NPRM, the D.C. Circuit decided the appeal in favor of 
Comcast.143  The panel held that the FCC, which premised its 
assertion of jurisdiction over Comcast on the Supreme Court’s dicta 
in Brand X, “stretche[d] the Court’s words too far . . . [b]y leaping 
from [the] observation that the Commission’s ancillary authority may 
allow it to impose some kinds of obligations on cable Internet 
providers to a claim of plenary authority over such providers.”144  
The D.C. Circuit’s conclusion that the FCC lacks statutorily delegated 
 
138 See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline 
Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14853 (2005). 
139 See In the Matter of Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the 
Internet Over Wireless Networks, 22 FCC Rcd. 5901 (2007). 
140 They are relieved of other obligations as well.  See Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 
at 975 (explaining that telecommunications carriers must charge just, reasonable, 
nondiscriminatory rates to customers, design their networks so that other carriers can 
interconnect with them, and contribute to the federal universal service fund). 
141 See Comcast Corp. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 600 F.3d 642 (2010). 
142 Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. at 996. 
143 Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 661. 
144 Id. at 650. 
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authority to regulate cable broadband providers under Title I has left 
the FCC to decide whether to reclassify broadband as a 
telecommunications service and thereby claim jurisdiction to regulate 
it under Title II.145 
The prospect of reclassification is controversial both within the 
FCC and in Congress,146 and broadband providers moved quickly 
after the Comcast decision to state publicly their view that any future 
action on broadband regulation should be a matter for Congress, not 
the FCC.147  In the thick of the fallout from Comcast, the FCC issued 
a notice of inquiry (NOI) proposing to reclassify only the connectivity 
component of broadband service as a Title II telecommunications 
service, leaving the information component unregulated.148  In the 
 
145 Following the D.C. Circuit’s decision, the FCC issued a statement conceding that the 
decision “invalidated the prior Commission’s approach to preserving an open Internet.”  
Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, FCC Statement on Comcast v. FCC Decision 
(Apr. 6, 2010), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC          
-297355A1.pdf.  The statement also asserted, however, that the court did not “close the 
door to other methods for achieving this important end.”  Id.  In a separately issued 
statement, Commissioner Michael Copps was less elliptical about the FCC’s options: “The 
only way the Commission can make lemonade out of this lemon of a decision is to do now 
what should have been done years ago: treat broadband as the telecommunications service 
that it is.”  Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Statement of Commissioner Michael 
J. Copps on the Comcast v. FCC Decision (Apr. 6, 2010), available at http://hraunfoss 
.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-297368A1.pdf. 
146 See Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Statement of Commissioner Robert M. 
McDowell on the Recent D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Decision in the 
Comcast/BitTorrent Case (Apr. 6, 2010), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs 
_public/attachmatch/DOC-297364A1.pdf (“I hope this decision . . . will not lead to the 
unnecessary classification of broadband service as a monopoly phone service under Title 
II of the Act.”).  Republican Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison of Texas, the Senate 
Commerce Committee’s ranking minority member, also spoke out against reclassification, 
asserting that the FCC could not act without approval from Congress.  Edward Wyatt, 
Despite Ruling, F.C.C. Says It Will Move Forward on Expanding Broadband, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 14, 2010,  http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/15/technology/15broadband.html?hpw. 
147 See Margaret Boles, AT&T on Comcast v. FCC Decision, AT&T PUB. POLICY BLOG 
(Apr. 6, 2010, 3:23 PM), http://attpublicpolicy.com/uncategorized/att-statement-on            
-comcast-v-fcc-decision/ (stating AT&T’s position that the FCC should look to Congress 
for clarification concerning its jurisdiction over broadband providers). 
148 See Notice of Inquiry, supra note 125, at 2 (outlining three alternative approaches to 
regulating broadband service).  The connectivity component of broadband service consists 
of “establishing a physical connection to the Internet and interconnecting with the Internet 
backbone,” as well as performing other functions that enable the transmission of data.  Id. 
at 8.  The information component consists of such services as e-mail, access to online 
newsgroups, and the ability to create a personal Web page.  See id.  In Brand X, the 
Supreme Court affirmed the FCC’s decision to treat the two components as unitary for 
regulatory purposes, subsuming them both under the rubric of information services.  The 
FCC now proposes to “unbundle” them for regulatory purposes. 
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NOI, the FCC attempts to map a “third way” between reclassifying 
broadband “as a ‘telecommunications service’ to which the full 
weight of Title II requirements would apply” and maintaining its 
current classification as a unitary information service to which no 
Title II requirements apply.149  In keeping with the aim of finding a 
middle ground between heavy regulation and no regulation, the NOI 
tempers the potentially onerous consequences of reclassification with 
the promise that the FCC will “forbear . . . from applying all 
provisions of Title II other than the small number that are needed to 
implement the fundamental universal service, competition and small 
business opportunity, and consumer protection policies that have 
received broad support.”150  The “third way” thus represents a species 
of light touch Title II regulation—a novel regulatory hybrid that 
offers an elegant solution to the perennial (and perennially vexing) 
problem of how to adapt old law to new technology. 
It is too soon to tell what the outcome of the NOI will be, or, 
indeed, whether the administrative process it began will be interrupted 
or preempted by legislative intervention.  If reclassification along the 
lines of the “third way” does occur, the FCC is unlikely to promulgate 
rules that altogether prohibit broadband providers from actively 
managing traffic on their networks.  The more probable scenario is 
that the FCC would exercise newly claimed Title II jurisdiction to 
move forward with the draft rules already proposed in the Open 
Internet NPRM,151 two of which specifically govern how broadband 
providers carry content for their customers: 
§8.5  Content. 
Subject to reasonable network management, a provider of 
broadband Internet access service may not prevent any of its users 
from sending or receiving the lawful content of the user’s choice 
over the Internet.152 
§8.13  Nondiscrimination. 
Subject to reasonable network management, a provider of 
broadband Internet access service must treat lawful content, 
applications, and services in a nondiscriminatory manner.153 
 
149 Id. at 13. 
150 Id. at 2. 
151 See Preserving the Open Internet, Broadband Industry Practices, 74 Fed. Reg. 
62638, 62661 (proposed Nov. 30, 2009) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 8). 
152 Id. (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 8.5). 
153 Id. (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 8.13). 
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The mandates in all six of the proposed rules, including the two 
quoted above, are “subject to reasonable network management,” 
which is defined to include “reasonable practices employed . . . [to] 
reduce or mitigate the effects of congestion . . . or to address quality-
of-service concerns . . . [or to] [p]revent the unlawful transfer of 
content.”154  The across-the-board allowance in the draft rules for 
“reasonable network management” is a clear sign that the FCC does 
not contemplate a wholesale return to a regime of mandatory passive 
carriage. 
Most relevant to the project of online copyright enforcement, 
broadband providers have leeway under the draft rules to prevent the 
unlawful transfer of content, an exception that seems designed to 
permit monitoring and blocking of infringing file transfers.155  In their 
formal comments to the FCC in response to the notice of proposed 
rule-making, trade groups representing corporate rights owners 
predictably expressed enthusiastic support for the network 
management exception as it relates to unlawful file transfers.156  In 
remarks to the National Association of Broadcasters during the week 
following the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Comcast, Chairman 
Genachowski took care to communicate to the audience his belief that 
net neutrality and online copyright enforcement are not mutually 
exclusive ends; in the space of a single sentence, he invoked both the 
importance of a free and open Internet and the need of broadcasters to 
prevent online copyright infringement.157 
 
154 Id. (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 8.3). 
155 Id. at 62650 (“In order for network openness obligations and appropriate 
enforcement of copyright laws to co-exist, it appears reasonable for a broadband Internet 
access service provider to refuse to transmit copyrighted material if the transfer of that 
material would violate applicable laws.”). 
156 See Comments of the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc. in the Matter of 
Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Industry Practices: Before the Fed. Commc’ns 
Comm’n, GN Docket No. 09-191, at ii (2010) (“MPAA urges the Commission, as it 
considers its approach to network neutrality, to make clear that ISPs are not only 
permitted, but encouraged, to work with content owners to employ the best available tools 
and technologies to combat online content theft.”); Comments of the Recording Industry 
Association of America in the Matter of Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Industry 
Practices: Before the Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, GN Docket No. 09-191, at 13 (2010), 
available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7020376700 (“We thus urge 
the Commission to adopt rules that not only allow ISPs to address online theft, but actively 
encourage their efforts to do so.  Crucial to this project, the Commission must ensure that 
its Open Internet rules do not have a chilling effect on such efforts.”). 
157 Julius Genachowski, Chairman, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, National Association of 
Broadcasters Show 2010, at 3 (Apr. 13, 2010), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs 
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While the rules proposed in the Open Internet NPRM would not 
require ISPs to block any file transfers, and while the DMCA clearly 
establishes that qualifying ISPs have no affirmative duty to monitor 
their services for transfers of infringing content, engagement by 
broadband providers in active network management changes their 
relationship to the material they carry for their customers in ways that 
have implications for the special rules of liability they enjoyed when 
they acted as mere conduits. 
C.  Common Carriers and Copyright Liability 
The affinities between the common law definition of a common 
carrier, the statutory definition of “telecommunications,” and the 
DMCA’s definition of a qualifying § 512(a) Internet service provider 
are apparent.  The emphasis in all three definitions is on the passive 
role of the carrier and the sender’s total dominion over both the 
destination and the contents of the transmission.  While the DMCA 
never uses the term “common carrier,” and while the narrowband 
access providers that existed when the statute was enacted were never 
regulated as common carriers by the FCC,158 the language of § 512(a) 
and (k) is firmly rooted in the tradition of common carriage. 
The policy underlying § 512(a)—that providers acting as passive 
conduits and automatically transmitting material chosen by others 
should not be held liable if that material turns out to be infringing—
was not without antecedent in copyright law when the DMCA was 
enacted in 1998.  Section 111 of the Copyright Act of 1976, which 
established a compulsory licensing scheme for cable systems that 
retransmit copyrighted programming, also accords special treatment 
to passive carriers.159  Before § 111 was enacted, cable operators paid 
no copyright royalties, even though they retransmitted copyrighted 
 
_public/attachmatch/DOC-297469A1.pdf (“I believe it’s vital that the Internet remain free 
and open for content creators like you to innovate and reach your audience, and vital also 
that you can protect your content online against unlawful copyright infringement.”). 
158 As the Ninth Circuit has explained, 
[a] conventional dial-up ISP provides its subscribers access to the Internet at a 
“point of presence” assigned a unique Internet address, to which the subscribers 
connect through telephone lines.  The telephone service linking the user and the 
ISP is classic “telecommunications” [subject to common carriage regulations].     
. . .  By contrast the FCC considers the ISP as providing “information services” 
under the Act. 
Brand X Internet Servs. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 345 F.3d 1120, 1128–29 (9th Cir. 
2003) (quoting AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 877 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
159 See 17 U.S.C. § 111(a)–(d) (2006). 
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over-the-air programming to the public.160  Under the licensing 
scheme in § 111, cable systems pay a semiannual fee to the Register 
of Copyrights, in return for which they receive a license.161  The fees 
collected from the cable systems are then distributed to copyright 
owners by the Copyright Royalty Board.162 
In addition to exempting local and network programming from the 
scope of liability for unlicensed retransmission by cable systems, 
Congress in § 111 exempted intermediary carriers that act “as a 
communications conduit between the distant broadcast station and 
interested cable systems.”163  To qualify for the exemption, a carrier 
must establish that it has “no direct or indirect control over the 
content or selection of the primary transmission or over the particular 
recipients of the secondary transmission” and that its “activities with 
respect to the secondary transmission consist solely of providing 
wires, cables, or other communications channels for the use of 
others.”164  In the § 111 analysis, the carrier’s nonintervention in the 
contents of the communication is a critical element: “To remain 
exempt, a carrier-retransmitter must avoid content control by 
retransmitting exactly what and all of what it receives . . . . To do 
otherwise could be perceived as the carrier’s making the transmission 
its own.”165  Leaping forward twenty-two years to the DMCA, § 
512(a) and (k) make the same requirement applicable to conduit ISPs 
seeking safe harbor: § 512(a) mandates that “the material is 
transmitted through the system or network without modification of its 
content.”166  Section 512(k) somewhat redundantly requires that a 
qualifying ISP provide routing and transmission “without 
modification to the content of the material as sent or received.”167 
Case law interpreting § 111 has held that the exemption is not 
limited to common carriers per se, but rather applies more broadly to 
 
160 Hubbard Broad., Inc. v. S. Satellite Sys., Inc., 777 F.2d 393, 395 (8th Cir. 1985). 
161 Id. 
162 Id.  The Copyright Royalty Tribunal, to which the Hubbard decision refers, was 
replaced in 1993 by the Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP), which was itself 
replaced in 2004 by the Copyright Royalty Board (CRB).  See U.S. Copyright Office, 
Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panels (CARP), COPYRIGHT, http://www.copyright.gov 
/carp/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2010). 
163 Hubbard Broad., Inc., 777 F.2d at 396. 
164 17 U.S.C. § 111(a)(3). 
165 E. Microwave, Inc. v. Doubleday Sports, Inc., 691 F.2d 125, 130 (2d Cir. 1982). 
166 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(5) (2006). 
167 Id. § 512(k)(1)(a). 
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all passive communications carriers (i.e., those that “do nothing but 
send a signal on”), regardless of the technology they employ, and 
regardless of whether they serve the sender or the receiver of the 
communication.168  Carriers held to be entitled to the exemption 
include, for example, signal conduits that receive broadcast signals, 
convert them into microwave signals, and relay the converted signals 
via either satellite or terrestrial microwave repeater stations to cable 
systems.169 
In addition to the pre-DMCA statutory precedent for exempting 
passive carriers from liability for copyright infringement, there is 
decisional precedent in cases involving conduit ISPs, including 
Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication 
Services, Inc.170  Netcom was decided in 1995, three years before the 
DMCA was enacted.  The holding in the case is that an Internet 
access provider that automatically and temporarily stores user-
supplied material on its Usenet servers cannot reasonably be held 
liable for direct infringement because it “merely provides access to 
the Internet” and “does not create or control the content of the 
information available to its subscribers.”171  Reasoning that it would 
simply not be “workable” given the sheer volume of bits moving 
through their systems to hold ISPs liable for infringing copies 
generated automatically for temporary storage, the Netcom court 
emphasized the ISP’s common carrier-like function: 
In a sense, a Usenet server that forwards all messages acts like a 
common carrier, passively retransmitting every message that gets 
sent through it.  Netcom would seem no more liable than the phone 
company for carrying an infringing facsimile transmission or 
storing an infringing audio recording on its voice mail.172 
Although the court was not entirely persuaded by Netcom’s argument 
that it functioned as a proper common carrier,173 the decision in the 
case ultimately turned on the passivity of Netcom’s copying and its 
 
168 See Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 63 F. Supp. 2d 420, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
169 See E. Microwave, Inc., 691 F.2d at 126. 
170 Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 
(N.D. Cal. 1995). 
171 Id. at 1372. 
172 Id. at 1369 n.12. 
173 See id. (“Here, perhaps, the analogy is not completely appropriate as Netcom does 
more than just ‘provide the wire and conduits.’  Further, Internet providers are not natural 
monopolies that are bound to carry all the traffic that one wishes to pass through them, as 
with the usual common carrier.”). 
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lack of control over the content transmitted.174  As with the cases 
interpreting § 111, the fact that the provider seeking the exemption 
was not a common carrier per se didn’t matter; the carrier’s passivity 
in relation to the carried content was what mattered. 
Revisiting the Netcom decision in light of the later-enacted DMCA, 
the Fourth Circuit in CoStar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc.175 rejected 
the argument that Netcom’s holding of non-liability for passive 
copying by ISPs was supplanted by the DMCA’s framework of 
affirmative defenses (i.e., the § 512 safe harbors).176  The court held 
that Loopnet, a Web-hosting service that enabled its users to upload 
photos of commercial real estate, was entitled to rebut CoStar’s case 
in chief by arguing that Loopnet’s conduct in making RAM copies of 
photos uploaded by its users did not exhibit the element of volition 
necessary to establish copying for statutory purposes.177  In 
concluding that Loopnet should not be considered an “actual 
duplicator” of the content uploaded by its users, the court relied on 
the oft-cited telephone company analogy: “Under such an 
arrangement, the ISP provides a system that automatically transmits 
users’ material but is itself totally indifferent to the material’s content.  
In this way, it functions as does a traditional telephone company when 
it transmits the contents of its users’ conversations.”178 
Both the Netcom and the CoStar courts found it dispositive that the 
accused ISPs were acting only as conduits for information provided 
by their subscribers.  The ISPs were indeed making copies of files 
uploaded by users, but they were doing so without knowledge of (or 
interest in) the contents of the files and with the sole aim of 
transmitting the contents from one subscriber to another.  In other 
words, the copies were being made passively by the system without 
any element of control or volition on the part of the ISP.  Without 
 
174 Id. at 1372 (holding that “it does not make sense to adopt a rule that could lead to the 
liability of countless parties whose role in the infringement is nothing more than setting up 
and operating a system that is necessary for the functioning of the Internet”). 
175 CoStar Grp., Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2004). 
176 Id. at 552. 
177 Id. at 551 (concluding that “an ISP has not itself fixed a copy in its system of more 
than transitory duration when it provides an Internet hosting service to its subscribers”); 
see also Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 129 (2d Cir. 
2008) (citing CoStar with approval and concluding that “the definition of ‘fixed’ imposes 
both an embodiment requirement and a duration requirement”). 
178 CoStar Grp., Inc., 373 F.3d at 551. 
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control or volition, the courts held, there is no reasonable basis for a 
finding of direct liability.179 
D.  The Liability Implications of Intelligent Networks 
Section 111 and § 512(a) of the Copyright Act together with 
Netcom and its progeny establish that intermediaries acting solely as 
passive carriers of content owned and controlled by others enjoy 
special treatment under copyright law.  This special treatment, as Tim 
Wu has argued, is a key feature of a “de facto communications 
regime” that has developed within copyright law.180  Before the rise 
of intelligent networks, conduit ISPs quite clearly qualified for special 
treatment as passive carriers, because all they did—like the phone 
company—was send other people’s data on its way.  Operators of 
intelligent broadband networks, by contrast, pride themselves on 
being more than “dumb pipes.”  In the shift from stupid to smart 
networks, which has entailed the deployment of packet-flow and 
packet-inspection technologies that enable broadband operators to 
both know and control what they’re carrying for their subscribers, 
broadband operators risk forfeiting the protections from copyright 
liability to which they were entitled as passive carriers. 
Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc.,181 a little-publicized 
district court case from 2009, may have important implications for 
broadband operators that make use of smart technologies within their 
systems.  The defendant in the case, Usenet.com, was a Usenet host 
that offered subscribers access to 120,000 Usenet newsgroups for a 
monthly fee.182  The plaintiffs were Arista Records and a handful of 
other major music distributors, who alleged that Usenet.com 
maintained a system that was overwhelmingly used for the purpose of 
 
179 Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. at 1370 (“Although copyright 
is a strict liability statute, there should still be some element of volition or causation which 
is lacking where a defendant's system is merely used to create a copy by a third party.”); 
CoStar Grp., Inc., 373 F.3d at 550 (endorsing the reasoning in Netcom and holding that the 
Copyright Act “require[s] some aspect of volition and meaningful causation—as distinct 
from passive ownership and management of an electronic Internet facility”).  The claim in 
CoStar was for direct infringement; the court left open the possibility that LoopNet’s 
conduct, with additional facts, could be a basis for indirect liability.  Id. at 551. 
180 See Timothy Wu, Copyright’s Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278, 279 
(2004) (arguing that copyright law embodies both authorship policy and communications 
policy). 
181 Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 124 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
182 Id. at 131. 
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illegally sharing copyrighted music files.183  The claims in the case 
were for direct infringement of the right of distribution and secondary 
infringement of the rights of reproduction and distribution.184 
In many ways, the facts of the case are reminiscent of those in 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.185  
Usenet.com’s operators were not distributors of P2P software, but 
they did all of the things that the file sharing cases have specifically 
taught network intermediaries not to do if they want to escape 
secondary liability for the infringements of their users: they marketed 
themselves “as a safe alternative to peer-to-peer file sharing programs 
that were getting shut down”; they included the terms “warez” and 
“kazaa” in their Web site’s metatags; they advertised “FREE 
MUSIC” and offered tutorials on how to download that used 
infringing files as illustrations.186  Given that such actions patently 
give rise under Grokster to secondary liability based on an 
inducement theory of infringement, the court’s decision that 
Usenet.com was secondarily liable for its users’ infringements was 
altogether predictable.187 
The more surprising aspect of the Usenet.com decision is the 
court’s analysis of the plaintiffs’ direct infringement claim, which 
culminated in a rejection of Usenet.com’s argument that it should be 
shielded from liability for unauthorized distribution by Netcom’s 
exemption for passive carriers.188  At least superficially, 
Usenet.com’s reliance on Netcom was apt; both providers were 
Usenet hosts that temporarily stored files received from other Usenet 
hosts and automatically routed those files in real time to the users 
requesting them.189  The Usenet system to which Usenet.com 
 
183 Id. at 131–32. 
184 Id. at 129.  The plaintiffs specifically alleged direct infringement, inducement of 
infringement, contributory infringement, and vicarious infringement.  Id. 
185 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936–37 
(2005) (holding that “one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to 
infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster 
infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties”). 
186 Usenet.com, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d at 132–33. 
187 The Court in Grokster found that the record in the case was “replete with evidence 
that [the defendants] clearly voiced the objective that recipients use [their software] to 
download copyrighted works, and each took active steps to encourage infringement.”  
Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. at 923–24. 
188 Usenet.com, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d at 148 (rejecting defendants’ reliance on Netcom). 
189 Id. at 130–31 (describing Usenet.com as a Usenet provider and explaining how the 
Usenet functions to disseminate messages and files throughout the network and to 
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connected its users in 2009 was the same system, with the same 
underlying architecture, to which Netcom connected its users back in 
1995.  On summary judgment, Usenet.com argued that it acted, like 
Netcom, as a “common carrier” that delivers requested files to 
subscribers without active involvement.190 
The court rejected the analogy, reasoning that unlike Netcom, 
which played no active role in selecting or managing the content 
flowing through its system, Usenet.com engaged in a number of 
forms of active network management: it blocked subscribers who 
posted spam; it throttled download speeds for subscribers who 
downloaded too much; and it took measures to restrict users from 
posting and downloading pornography.191  It engaged in “automated 
filtering and human review, to remove access to certain categories of 
content, and to block certain users.”192  What it didn’t do, even 
though it knew its service was being used to infringe copyrights, was 
use the technology at its disposal to block or attempt to block 
copyright infringing transfers.193  The active steps Usenet.com took 
“transform[ed] Defendants from passive providers of a space in which 
infringing activities happened to occur [in]to active participants in the 
process of copyright infringement.”194  The court concluded that 
Usenet.com’s network management activities satisfied the 
requirement of volitional conduct that was lacking in Netcom.195  
Therefore, unlike Netcom, which escaped liability for direct 
infringement because it did nothing to intervene in the flow of traffic 
across its system, Usenet.com was liable as a direct infringer of the 
plaintiffs’ distribution right. 
 
facilitate the sharing of content among users); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line 
Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1368 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (explaining that Netcom 
“maintain[s] a system whereby software automatically forwards messages received from 
subscribers onto the Usenet, and temporarily stores copies on its system”). 
190 Usenet.com, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d at 148. 
191 Id. at 157. 
192 Id. at 148. 
193 Id. at 153 (stating that although the defendants used “various tools and mechanisms” 
to block spam and limit download speeds, “they never used the same filtering capabilities 
to search for, limit or eliminate infringement on their service”). 
194 Id. at 149 (quoting Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 
503, 513 (N.D. Ohio 1997)). 
195 But see CoStar Grp., Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 556 (4th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that “[a]lthough LoopNet engages in volitional conduct to block photographs 
measured by two grossly defined criteria, this conduct, which takes only seconds, does not 
. . . add volition to LoopNet’s involvement in storing the copy”). 
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In theory, the same logic that barred Usenet.com from relying on 
Netcom’s exemption for passive carriers is applicable to broadband 
providers that use DPI and other smart network technology to manage 
the flow of traffic across their networks.  Moreover, given that the 
DMCA safe harbor in § 512(a) incorporates a passive carriage 
requirement, conduit ISPs that have implemented packet inspection 
and filtering technologies within their networks—for reasons wholly 
unrelated to copyright enforcement—may find that they have dropped 
anchor in choppy waters if they have occasion to invoke the DMCA 
safe harbors in their defense. 
The use of smart network technology impacts the availability to 
broadband providers of the defenses on which passive carriers are 
entitled to rely in actions for copyright infringement.  The Usenet.com 
decision suggests, reasonably enough, that the benefits of traffic 
management and increased control over user content come with an 
obligation to assist in reducing infringement.  It also suggests, 
reasonably enough, that the ability of a provider to filter for infringing 
content is becoming more germane to the analysis of intermediary 
liability as filtering technology improves.  Jane Ginsburg considered 
this possibility in the wake of Grokster, given the Court’s conclusion 
in the case that failure to filter, among other factors, is probative of a 
provider’s intent to induce infringement.196  The decision in 
Usenet.com supports Ginsburg’s thesis that technological evolution 
may be in the process of readjusting the balance struck in the DMCA 
between copyright owners and service providers.  The HEOA’s 
requirement that college and university ISPs implement technology-
based deterrents within their networks is further proof that a 
technology-driven reallocation of legal burdens is underway.197 
It is worth remembering in this context that the Netcom court’s 
decision was premised in part on the technical limitations to which 
ISPs were subject in 1995, when it was, in the words of the court, 
“practically impossible to screen out infringing bits from 
noninfringing bits.”198  We now live in a different state of the art; 
 
196 See Jane C. Ginsburg, Separating the Sony Sheep From the Grokster Goats: 
Reckoning the Future Business Plans of Copyright-Dependent Technology Entrepreneurs, 
50 ARIZ. L. REV. 577, 587 (2008) (positing that filtering may, in the wake of Grokster, 
afford a type of safe harbor from claims of inducement to infringe). 
197 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
198 Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 
1372–73 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
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filtering technologies have been adopted by major online 
intermediaries, including YouTube199 and Lime Wire,200 whose users 
engage in a high volume of file and content sharing, much of it 
infringing.  With the development of DPI, conduit ISPs from a 
technical standpoint are in a dramatically better position now than 
they were in 1995 to know and control the content they carry for their 
customers.  While this is an alarming prospect for privacy 
advocates,201 corporate rights owners view it as an opportunity.  
Moreover, broadband providers have strenuously resisted net 
neutrality regulation that would put any constraints on the uses to 
which they can put smart technology inside their networks.  
Considering the state of the art and the appetite of broadband 
providers for smarter networks and greater control over traffic, it is 
difficult to argue that today’s conduit ISPs are not significantly better 
situated than their narrowband predecessors were to help prevent 
infringing uses of their services. 
III 
GRADUATED RESPONSE AND CONSUMER PROTECTION 
As broadband providers venture outside the safety of § 512(a) and 
Netcom in the name of “reasonable network management,” it is in 
their self-interest to explore increased cooperation with corporate 
rights owners in the war on piracy.  Some ISPs have begun to do so 
under the umbrella of Arts+Labs, a collaborative that self-represents 
as a “partnership between technology companies and creators” that is 
 
199 See Andy Greenberg, YouTube’s Filter Fails to Please, FORBES.COM, Oct. 18, 2007, 
http://www.forbes.com/2007/10/18/google-viacom-video-tech-cx_ag_1018youtube.html. 
200 See The Lime Wire Beta Filtering System, LIME WIRE, http://register.limewire.com 
/filter/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2010). 
201 Consumer advocacy groups such as Free Press and the Center for Democracy & 
Technology oppose the use of DPI on privacy grounds.  See, e.g., The Privacy 
Implications of Deep Packet Inspection: Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Commc’ns, 
Tech. and the Internet of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. (2009) 
(statement of Leslie Harris, President and Chief Executive Officer, Center for Democracy 
& Technology), available at http://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/20090423_dpi_testimony.pdf; 
M. CHRIS RILEY & BEN SCOTT, FREE PRESS, DEEP PACKET INSPECTION: THE END OF THE 
INTERNET AS WE KNOW IT? (2009), available at http://www.freepress.net/files/Deep 
_Packet_Inspection_The_End_of_the_Internet_As_We_Know_It.pdf.  Privacy-conscious 
users can defeat DPI, however, by encrypting their file transfers.  Bridy, supra note 8, at 
595–96.  According to some estimates, 20% of BitTorrent traffic is already encrypted.  See 
Brad Reed, Could Traffic Filtering Get AT&T Into Trouble?, PC WORLD, Jan. 18, 2008, 
http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/141520/could_traffic_filtering_get_atandt
_into_trouble.html. 
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dedicated to educating consumers about the dangers of “net 
pollution—spam, malware, computer viruses and illegal file 
trafficking.”202  In comments before the FCC in the Open Internet 
NPRM, Arts+Labs echoed the MPAA’s call for government 
nonintervention in the private ordering of online copyright 
enforcement: “Content creators should be able to work with any other 
Internet participant on enhancements that enable them to directly 
combat digital theft and to better compete with Internet piracy by 
offering higher quality, safety, and reliability.”203  “Enhancements” of 
this nature are expressly contemplated in § 512(i), which defines 
“standard technical measures” to combat infringement in terms of “a 
broad consensus of copyright owners and service providers in an 
open, fair, voluntary, multi-industry standards process.”204  How 
privately implemented enforcement measures might ultimately affect 
consumers, however, must be weighed carefully and managed 
prudently, particularly given that consumers have no place at the table 
when it comes to negotiations between broadband providers and 
rights owners about how best to “combat digital theft.”  This Part of 
the Article proposes a number of principles to guide private ordering 
in the arena of online copyright enforcement so that the interests of 
consumers are not shortchanged. 
A.  The Impact of Disconnection 
In some countries in the European Union, universal access to 
broadband is regarded as a basic right.205  This is not the case in the 
United States, but Congress in 2009 appropriated $4.7 billion in 
economic stimulus funds to enhance the U.S. broadband infrastructure 
 
202 About Us, ARTS+LABS, http://www.artsandlabs.com/about_us/About_Us.aspx (last 
visited Oct. 2, 2010).  Members of the collaborative include AT&T, Verizon, Viacom, 
NBC Universal, Microsoft, BMI, ASCAP, and the Songwriters Guild of America.  Id. 
203 Comments of Arts+Labs in the Matter of Preserving the Open Internet Broadband 
Industry Practices: Before the Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, GN Docket No. 09-191 (2010). 
204 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(2)(A) (2006). 
205 Finland was the first country in the world to create a legal right to broadband 
Internet access.  See Saeed Ahmed, Fast Internet Access Becomes a Legal Right in 
Finland, CNN, Oct. 15, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/TECH/10/15/finland.internet 
.rights/index.html.  Spain soon followed.  See Spain Makes Broadband a Universal Right, 
CBC NEWS, Nov. 18, 2009, http://www.cbc.ca/technology/story/2009/11/18/spain             
-universal-broadband-access.html. 
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and expand access to unserved populations.206  This substantial public 
investment in broadband uptake recognizes the critical role the 
Internet now plays in contemporary American life and the extent to 
which the public and the economy have come to rely on uninterrupted 
connectivity.  Taking this reliance into account, termination of 
Internet access represents a powerful and far-reaching sanction that 
directly impacts not only the ability of Internet users to consume 
media but also their ability to work, learn, communicate, manage 
finances, and participate in the collective life of society.  Even a 
temporary suspension of access can represent a hardship, particularly 
considering that a whole household stands to lose access under a 
graduated response regime as a result of a single member’s supposed 
copyright infringements.  In light of these factors, privately 
implemented graduated response regimes should be designed to 
minimize the likelihood of mistaken responses, to maximize 
opportunities for consumer compliance before the imposition of any 
sanction, and to limit the duration of any access-related sanction 
imposed in the absence of a neutral adjudication of infringement. 
B.  Opportunity to Contest Notices 
Users should be given an opportunity to contest notices of 
infringement with their ISPs as the notices are received and before 
any sanction is imposed.  When the music industry first began suing 
individual file sharers, it pursued a number of well-publicized cases 
of mistaken identity, about which its representatives were glibly 
unapologetic: if they dragged some innocent people into court along 
with the guilty ones, they said, that was the cost of making a good 
point.207  The problem of false positives in online copyright 
surveillance, whether that surveillance is being carried out by human 
agents or automated crawlers, is well documented208 and has 
 
206 See U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Nat’l Telecomms. & Info. Admin., Broadband 
Technology Opportunities Program (BTOP), BROADBAND USA: CONNECTING 
AMERICA’S COMMUNITIES, http://www2.ntia.doc.gov/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2010). 
207 See Dennis Roddy, The Song Remains the Same, PITTSBURGH POST GAZETTE, Sept. 
14, 2003, http://www.post-gazette.com/columnists/20030914edroddy0914p1.asp. 
208 See, e.g., DANIEL CASTRO ET AL., THE INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., STEAL 
THESE POLICIES: STRATEGIES FOR REDUCING DIGITAL PIRACY 10 (2009) (advocating 
filtering but conceding that “content recognition systems are not perfect”); MICHAEL 
PIATEK ET AL., CHALLENGES AND DIRECTIONS FOR MONITORING P2P FILE SHARING 
NETWORKS—OR—WHY MY PRINTER RECEIVED A DMCA TAKEDOWN NOTICE 1 (2008) 
(stating that “it is possible for a malicious user (or buggy software) to implicate (frame) 
seemingly any network endpoint in the sharing of copyrighted materials”); Yu, supra note 
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undermined public confidence in both the methods and the good faith 
of corporate rights owners.  In the project of online surveillance, 
rights owners have historically put zeal before accuracy.  If 
broadband operators agree to adopt graduated response protocols, 
especially if those protocols involve ISP-based filtering of material 
identified as copyright infringing, that order of priority must be 
reversed.  To that end, the technologies on which ISPs rely to block 
infringing file transfers should be mature and thoroughly tested before 
they are deployed.209  Whether—and, if so, how—such technologies 
can be calibrated to recognize fair uses of copyrighted content remain 
vexing questions that proponents of filtering, to their discredit, tend to 
ignore.210  Assuming that false positives will occur, even in the most 
sophisticated digital fingerprinting or watermarking systems, 
broadband providers should provide subscribers with an efficient, 
accessible, and responsive process for contesting the notices of 
infringement they receive—something akin to the counter-notice and 
put-back provisions in § 512(g) of the DMCA.211 
C.  Correspondence of Notices to “Strikes” 
When it comes to adding up strikes, ISPs should count a single 
notice of infringement that alleges multiple instances of infringement 
as only one “strike” against the subscriber receiving the notice.  To do 
otherwise would effectively take the “graduated” out of graduated 
response and would undermine the rehabilitative principle that 
 
10, at 15 (asserting that “infringement-identifying technology has been fairly unreliable 
thus far”). 
209 Opponents of filtering question whether the technology will ever be sophisticated 
enough and argue that it is doomed to be both overinclusive and underinclusive in its 
blocking.  See, e.g., MEHAN JAYASURIYA ET AL., PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE, FORCING THE 
NET THROUGH A SIEVE: WHY COPYRIGHT FILTERING IS NOT A VIABLE SOLUTION FOR 
U.S. ISPS (2009), available at http://www.publicknowledge.org/pdf/pk-filtering                 
-whitepaper-200907.pdf. 
210 As an example, BayTSP, which has successfully marketed its Content 
Authentication Platform to major movie studios, music labels, and sports leagues, touts the 
accuracy of its system, but it makes no mention of protecting fair uses of copyrighted 
digital content.  See BayTSP Announces 15 Customers Using its Content Authentication 
Platform for Copyright, ALL BUSINESS (Mar. 2, 2009), http://www.allbusiness.com 
/media-telecommunications/movies-sound-recording/11799800-1.html (announcing that 
fifteen companies are using BayTSP’s Content Authentication Platform and describing the 
underlying technologies as “best of breed”). 
211 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(3) (2006) (setting forth the means by which recipients of 
notices of infringement can counter the allegations therein and request restoration of 
blocked content). 
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infringing consumers should be given repeated opportunities to 
reform and comply.  In the context of § 512(i), rights owners have 
advocated a definition of “repeat infringer” that would require 
termination of access for a user who has received only two notices of 
infringement, if the first notice alleged multiple infringements.212  
The position is overly aggressive, given the margin of error involved 
in precisely identifying infringers213 and the fact that notices of 
infringement generated by rights owners are only red flags of 
infringement and not legal judgments.214  While corporate rights 
owners have shown little inclination to recognize the important 
difference between an accusation and a judgment when it comes to 
online infringement, ISPs have service obligations to their subscribers 
that require them to be more circumspect.  If, as representatives of 
notice-forwarding ISPs have said, repeat notices to the same user are 
seldom required to secure compliance,215 then counting one notice as 
no-more-than-one strike will not meaningfully compromise 
deterrence. 
D.  Graduation of Sanctions 
The principle underlying graduated response is that sanctions 
should escalate as infractions accrete.  The disciplinary approach is an 
incremental one, and in the interest of consumer protection, there 
should be more, rather than fewer, increments when it comes to the 
nature and duration of access-related sanctions.  To maximize 
opportunities for Internet users to comply, ISPs that agree to 
implement a graduated response regime should graduate the access-
 
212 See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1116–18 
(C.D. Cal. 2009). 
213 Online surveillance of P2P networks results only in the identification of IP addresses 
involved in the sharing of copyrighted files, not in the identification of the individuals 
sharing those files.  Because IP addresses are sometimes dynamically assigned, and 
because more than one person can connect to the Internet from a single, fixed IP address, it 
is inaccurate to assert a one-to-one correspondence between an IP address and an infringer. 
214 See Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1105 (W.D. Wash. 
2004) (pointing out that notices from rights owners could be erroneous and do not, on their 
own, provide evidence of blatant copyright infringement). 
215 See David Carnoy, Verizon Ends Service of Alleged Illegal Downloaders, CNET 
NEWS, Jan. 20, 2010, http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10437176-93.html?tag=news 
LeadStoriesArea.1 (“[The Verizon representative] also noted that . . . issuing warning 
letters is proving to be effective.”); Greg Sandoval, AT&T Exec: ISP Will Never Terminate 
Service on RIAA’s Word, CNET NEWS, Mar. 25, 2009, http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023 
_3-10204514-93.html (“[An AT&T vice president] said the notices worked.  The company 
saw very few repeat offenders.”). 
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related sanctions they impose, beginning with a speed sanction after 
three uncontested notices and graduating to a brief suspension of 
access with the fourth.  Because false positives are likely, and 
innocents often co-connect with infringers, ISPs should refrain from 
imposing access-related sanctions of any significant duration (e.g., 
more than a few days) absent a neutral adjudication of infringement 
obtained by a copyright owner.  For cases involving truly persistent or 
high-volume infringers, rights owners have, as they have always had, 
recourse to courts of law.  In such cases, they should continue to 
vindicate their rights judicially and should not look to graduated 
response as a panacea. 
Not all ISPs are going to be amenable to imposing access-related 
sanctions without a court order.  While Comcast and Verizon reserve 
the right in their terms of service to make unilateral judgments about 
account terminations in cases involving copyright infringement,216 
AT&T has said publicly that the company will not suspend or 
terminate any user’s access without a court order.217  From the point 
of view of DMCA compliance, the insistence on a court order is 
defensible in light of the ambiguity that lingers around the definition 
of “repeat infringer.”218  How and to what extent providers that 
reserve the right to make their own judgments about infringing 
activity are exercising their discretion is difficult to know. 
For ISPs that are inclined to impose access-related sanctions based 
solely on notices of infringement (i.e., without a court order), the 
efficacy of short suspensions should be tested empirically before 
sanctions of longer duration are considered.  The goal should be to 
identify and implement the minimum sanction necessary to achieve 
broad-based compliance.  If graduated response works, as rights 
owners seem confident it will, there will be few cases that actually 
test what it means to be “out” after three strikes.  The cases on the 
margin should be treated as candidates for full adjudication on the 
merits. 
 
216 See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
217 See Sandoval, supra note 215 (quoting Jim Cicconi, a senior executive vice 
president at AT&T). 
218 See supra notes 43 and 59 and accompanying text. 
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E.  Disclosure of Enforcement Practices 
Broadband providers should provide full disclosure of their 
copyright enforcement practices to prospective and existing 
customers, including whether they use packet inspection or other 
intrusive technology for copyright enforcement purposes.  The Open 
Internet NPRM requires providers of broadband Internet access to 
“disclose such information concerning network management and 
other practices as is reasonably required for users and content, 
application, and service providers to enjoy the protections” secured by 
the proposed rules.219  This transparency requirement, vague as it is, 
has its roots in the Comcast torrent-throttling episode.220  Rather than 
disclosing to users that it was blocking P2P traffic to control network 
congestion, Comcast actively concealed its activities from the 
affected users by sending fake error messages.221  The messages 
made it appear as if the transfers were failing for reasons outside of 
Comcast’s control.222 
On the heels of the Comcast incident, researchers conducting a 
study in early 2008 observed thousands of incidents in which 
BitTorrent uploads were being blocked by ISPs.223  At the time, the 
ISPs responsible for most of the blocking had not publicly disclosed 
their network management practices.224  If the network management 
practices in which ISPs engage are truly justified and reasonable, as 
ISPs contend, then there is no legitimate reason not to disclose them.  
Moreover, users have a right to know how broadband networks are 
being managed if management practices materially impact their 
online experience, including their ability to engage in high-speed file 
transfers using P2P protocols. 
In terms of copyright enforcement disclosures, the DMCA has long 
conditioned the availability of its safe harbors on ISPs’ adopting and 
publishing policies that provide for termination of subscribers who 
 
219 Preserving the Open Internet, Broadband Industry Practices, 74 Fed. Reg. 62638, 
62662 (proposed Nov. 30, 2009) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 8). 
220 See Bridy, supra note 8, at 598–99; see also Preserving the Open Internet, 
Broadband Industry Practices, 74 Fed. Reg. at 62648 (referring to the Comcast episode as 
an instance of a service provider “concealing information that consumers would consider 
relevant in choosing a service provider or a particular service option”). 
221 Bridy, supra note 8, at 598–99. 
222 See id. 
223 Preserving the Open Internet, Broadband Industry Practices, 74 Fed. Reg. at 62648. 
224 Id. 
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are repeat infringers.225  The language of these policies tends to track 
the language of the statute very closely and provides little if any detail 
about actual implementation.226  If a broadband provider agrees to 
engage in graduated response and/or filtering on behalf of rights 
owners, that provider should so disclose in its terms of service.  The 
disclosure should be affirmative and not merely couched in terms of a 
reservation of rights.  Comcast’s current terms of use, for example, 
expressly reserve the right “to monitor bandwidth, usage, 
transmissions, and content” and take remedial actions including 
“temporary or permanent removal of content, . . . filtering of Internet 
transmissions, and the immediate suspension or termination of all or 
any portion of the Service.”227  Cox reserves the right in its subscriber 
agreement to “monitor . . . any content . . . in Cox’s possession . . . as 
Cox deems necessary to satisfy any applicable law” and the right to 
engage in “protocol filtering.”228  Verizon reserves the right to “block 
or remove any unlawful content [that users] . . . transmit to or from 
any Verizon server.”229  Each of these reservations of rights is drafted 
so broadly that any one of these providers could begin filtering for 
rights owners tomorrow without revising the existing language or 
providing any additional notice to subscribers.  In the interest of 
transparency, broadband providers should be more forthright about 
their copyright enforcement policies—telling users not what they 
might do, but what they actually do. 
CONCLUSION 
When Congress passed the DMCA in 1998, it did so with the stated 
goal of “preserv[ing] strong incentives for service providers and 
copyright owners to cooperate to detect and deal with copyright 
infringements that take place in the digital networked 
environment.”230  Although the DMCA did not make monitoring for 
infringing content a condition of any ISP’s eligibility for safe harbor, 
the legislative history is clear that the creation of safe harbors was 
 
225 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A) (2006). 
226 See supra note 97 and sources cited therein (quoting ISP terms of service and 
acceptable use policies). 
227 Comcast Acceptable Use Policy, supra note 97. 
228 Cox Communications Subscriber Agreement, supra note 111. 
229 Verizon Terms of Service, supra note 97. 
230 H.R. REP. NO. 105-796, at 72 (1998). 
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“not intended to discourage the service provider from monitoring its 
service for infringing material.”231  Inasmuch as the DMCA was 
designed to promote interindustry cooperation between rights owners 
and ISPs, the seeds of graduated response were sown more than a 
decade ago, before the broadband revolution and well before the 
development of smart network technologies like DPI.  The 
government’s 2010 Joint Strategic Plan on Intellectual Property 
Enforcement expresses continuing official support for interindustry 
cooperation in online copyright enforcement, particularly with respect 
to the phenomenon of repeat infringement.232 
As filtering technologies have become more sophisticated, and as 
ISPs have implemented them for reasons unrelated to copyright 
enforcement, the groundwork has been laid—though perhaps only 
accidentally—for a private reallocation of online copyright 
enforcement burdens.  The FCC, even if it acts to reclassify the 
connectivity component of broadband as a Title II 
telecommunications service, is unlikely to intervene in the name of 
net neutrality to prevent this private (re)ordering by, for example, 
prohibiting content blocking or filtering by ISPs.  If that turns out to 
be the case, ISPs and rights owners must take it upon themselves, in 
the interest of the customers they aim to get and keep, to ensure that 
their private arrangements for enforcing copyrights online are both 
adequately transparent and meaningfully consumer-protective.233 
 
 
231 Id. at 73. 
232 See OFFICE OF THE U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROP. ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR, 2010 
JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT 17 (2010), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/intellectualproperty/intellectual 
property_strategic_plan.pdf (“The Administration believes that it is essential for the 
private sector, including content owners, Internet service providers, advertising brokers, 
payment processors and search engines, to work collaboratively . . . to seek practical and 
efficient solutions to address infringement. . . . Specifically, the Administration encourages 
actions by the private sector to effectively address repeated acts of infringement, while 
preserving the norms of legitimate competition, free speech, fair process and the privacy of 
users.”). 
233 It is significant in this regard that the Joint Strategic Plan, id., even as it encourages 
greater cooperation between ISPs and rights owners to address repeat infringement, cites 
the need to protect the norms of privacy, fairness, and free expression. 
